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ABSRACT
An Investigation into the Structure of Self-Control
by
Parker A. Dreves
Self-control has been measured using a variety of methods including self-report measures,
cognitive inhibition tasks, delay discounting and delay of gratification tasks, and persistence and
willpower tasks. Although these are all theoretically linked to processes involved in self-control,
recent evidence has shown that these diverse measurement techniques relate only minimally to
one another. Assuming that self-control is a reflective construct, this would indicate that many of
these tasks are poor indicators of self-control. The present research challenges the common
assumption that self-control is a reflective construct and instead proposes that self-control is a
formative construct. Conceptualizing self-control as a formative construct could reconcile some
of the inconsistencies in the literature, in particular the fact that many indicators for self-control
do not correlate highly. To examine the possibility of a formative model of self-control, this
research examines 13 commonly used measures of self-control and investigates indicator
intercorrelations, indicator relationships with the theoretical consequences of self-control, and
performs a vanishing tetrad test (Bollen & Ting, 2000). Results show that in general, indicator
intercorrelations are low and nonsignificant as well as indictor correlations with theorized
construct consequences. The results of the vanishing tetrad test suggest a reflective interpretation
of self-control, but concerns with uniformly low covariances between indicators limit the
interpretation of this test.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Self-control is arguably one of the most important capacities that humans possess.
Although animals may possess self-control over extremely short time spans, such as a dog sitting
patiently in anticipation of a treat, humans are able to direct behavior toward rewards that are
considerably more distant and may not be realized for months, years, or decades. This ultimately
allows humans to engage in behaviors that promote positive long-term outcomes, such as better
emotional stability, health, and school and work performance (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone,
2004).
Fundamentally, self-control control dilemmas are characterized by a battle between longterm goals or values and the immediate temptations that thwart those goals or values (Fujita,
2011). Successful self-control is defined as engaging in behaviors that progress one toward a
long-term goal or, conversely, abstaining from behaviors that thwart the realization of long-term
goals. Although many consider the second part of this definition – abstaining – to be the defining
feature of self-control, it should be noted that impulse inhibition is but one strategy among many
for furthering long-term goals (Magen & Gross, 2010). Values are included in this definition to
highlight the fact that not all self-control dilemmas involve temporally distant goals. For
example, one might value animal welfare, honesty, or fairness, which are not necessarily longterm goals, but do provide individuals with reasons to control behavior. Like long-term goals,
values weigh on decision-making processes.
There are two main types of self-control: inhibitory self-control and initiatory self-control
(de Ridder, de Boer, Lugtig, Bakker, & van Hooft, 2011). Inhibitory self-control refers to
7

impulse inhibition or abstaining from behaviors that thwart long-term goals, such as resisting
eating a tempting slice of cake that would thwart a weight loss goal. By contrast, initiatory selfcontrol refers to enacting some behavior that promotes a long-term goal, such as going to the
gym to further one’s weight loss goal. In this example, both behaviors are considered self-control
because they both promote the attainment of a long-term goal, but one involves inhibiting
behaviors where the other involves initiating a behavior. Factor analysis suggests that inhibitory
and initiatory self-control are separable constructs and each form of self-control relates
differently to various goal-related behaviors. Inhibitory self-control is more predictive of the
frequency of undesired behaviors, such as smoking cigarettes or drinking, whereas initiatory selfcontrol is more predictive of desirable behaviors such as hours of study (de Ridder et al., 2011).
This highlights the fact that self-control is a multidimensional construct not just limited to the
inhibition of impulses.
Strategies for Exercising Self-Control
Self-control can be subdivided further into specific strategies for goal-pursuit (Fujita,
2011; Magen & Gross, 2010). These include situation selection, situation modification, cognitive
change, distraction, impulse inhibition, or initiatory strategies such as forming implementation
intentions and actively engaging in behaviors that lead to goal-progress. Situation selection refers
to avoiding situations where temptations are likely. An example of situation selection would be a
recovering alcoholic avoiding going to the bar altogether, or a dieter avoiding the snack food isle
at the supermarket. Situation modification refers to changing something about a situation to
make self-control more likely, such as bringing a friend with you to the gym to make sure you
exercise. Cognitive change, also referred to a reconstrual (Fujita & Carnevale, 2012), refers to
reframing a temptation to make it seem less appealing. As an example, a dieter may counter the
8

temptation of unhealthy food by thinking about the negative health effects of eating poorly, or
how they might feel after overeating. Implementation intentions, colloquially known as planning,
refer to forming plans for remediation if one does indulge (Gollwitzer, 1999). An example of an
implementation intention would be “if I snack too much today, I will go to the gym.” Finally,
impulse inhibition (sometimes called response modulation; see Magen & Gross, 2010) refers to
the effortful suppression of impulses (Baumeister, 2002; Diamond, 2013) and, in some models of
self-control, is considered a last resort after other strategies for self-control have failed (Fujita,
2011).
The variety of strategies available for exercising self-control poses challenges for
researchers seeking to measure this construct. First, it produces a lack of clarity in terms of
which strategy is being assessed, since all of these strategies are grouped under the umbrella term
“self-control.” For example, the Stroop task, the go/no-go task, delay of gratification tasks, the
cold pressor task, food taste tests, and persistence tasks have all been grouped under the label
“self-control” (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010).
However, each of these tasks may allow or disallow the use of different self-control strategies.
For example, distraction from the tempting stimulus reliably increases delay times on delay of
gratification tasks (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff Zeiss, 1972), but distraction cannot be used on
measures of cognitive inhibition such as the Stroop task. The fact that different goal pursuit
strategies may be used on different tasks muddies the interpretation of what processes are at
work for any given test of self-control. Second, isolating components of self-control decreases
the ecological validity of research using these measures since in everyday life individuals use a
variety of inhibitory and initiatory strategies for goal pursuit to meet situational demands.
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Although all of these strategies are important subcomponents of self-control, considering any
one of them to be an indicative test of global self-control may be an error.
Given all of the different ways that self-control may be exercised, it is perhaps
unsurprising that self-control has been assessed using seemingly disparate measures. To be sure,
measuring self-control has been met with difficulty and experts in the field still hotly debate
which types of tasks do and do not utilize self-control resources (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). As
a result, self-control has been assessed using a wide variety of measures including self-report
measures, attention and response inhibition tasks, delay of gratification and delay discounting
tasks, and persistence and willpower tasks. The fact that each of these measures assess different
subcomponents of self-control may, in part, explain the lack of comparable results among labs
using different measures (Blázquez, Botella, & Suero 2017; Carter, Kofler, Forster, &
McCullough, 2015; Lurquin & Miyake, 2017; Monterosso & Luo, 2013). The following section
reviews each form of measurement, the rationale for using them, and which particular strategies
of goal pursuit each measure may assess. The main focus of this paper will be behavioral
measures of self-control that are frequently used in laboratory experiments, rather than selfreport measures.
Approaches to Measuring Self-Control
In a discussion of measurement, an important distinction is the difference between trait
and state self-control. State self-control refers to self-control at a specific time -- specifically at
the time of measurement. By contrast, trait self-control refers to self-control in general, or an
average across the person’s life. This is relevant to a discussion of measurement for three
reasons. First, whether a researcher is interested in state or trait self-control will determine the
choice of measures. State self-control is most commonly assessed with behavioral measures,
10

such as in ego-depletion paradigms where self-control is measured following an exhausting task
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Trait self-control is most commonly assessed
via self-report measures that allow individuals to reflect upon their behavior across a variety of
circumstances and times. The present research is primarily interested in examining measures of
state self-control as they are the most dubious in the sense that many of them lack formal
validation (Lurquin & Miyake, 2017).
Second, trait self-control does not necessarily predict state self-control. This is because
there are many idiosyncratic situational factors that influence state self-control such as the
proximity to temptations, intoxication, fatigue, and the presence of others (Hofmann,
Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). Third, and perhaps most importantly, in many experimental
paradigms state self-control typically only refers to one specific strategy for exerting self-control,
which is determined by the researcher’s choice of measures. For example, a researcher using the
go/no go task as a measure of self-control is equating state self-control with cognitive inhibition,
whereas a researcher using the cold pressor task is equating state self-control with pain tolerance.
Still other tasks may assess behavioral inhibition, attention, or preference for delayed rewards,
but all of these are frequently grouped under the term self-control.
Constructs such as attention, inhibition, initiation of behavior, distraction, pain tolerance,
and delay of reward are distinct and separable from one another, so using the blanket term “selfcontrol” can be problematic when discussing interpretations of experiments using different
measures. Researchers should be aware of these assumptions and conscious of the fact that selfcontrol is often operationally defined in different ways within different experimental paradigms.
In everyday life, people use a variety of strategies for self-control, including impulse inhibition,
situation selection, distraction, cognitive change, and counteractive evaluations (Fujita, 2011;
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Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010; Magen & Gross, 2010). Although each of these may be
important subcomponents of self-control, considering any one of them in isolation will fail to
fully encompass the construct.
In discussions of measurement, there are typically three categories that measures of state
self-control fall into. These are executive function/impulse inhibition, delay discounting/delay of
gratification, and persistence/willpower tasks. Each of these measures may assess different
components of self-control. For example, impulse inhibition measures assess the ability to
override an automatic response, whereas delay of gratification measures assess attention toward
distal rewards. The assumptions for using each type of measurement are outlined below.
Executive function and response inhibition tests of self-control include tasks such as the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the go/no go task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the stop signal task
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), and the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). The rationale for
using these as measures of self-control is that these tasks involve inhibiting an automatic or
prepotent response, which many consider a defining feature of self-control (Baumeister, 2002;
Diamond, 2013). Consider, for example, the Stroop task. In this task, participants are presented
with the words of colors. On some of the trials the words are printed in the same color of ink as
what the word says (e.g., GREEN printed in green ink). On other trials, the words are printed in a
different color of ink than what the words says (e.g., GREEN printed in red ink). The participants
are tasked with correctly naming the font color and must ignore what the word says. This elicits
competition between language and visual systems, such that participant must inhibit the impulse
to read the word and instead correctly name the color of ink in which the word is printed. This
reliably produces an interference effect, where individuals take longer to correctly name colors
on trials with colors that do not match the text (Stroop, 1935). The interference score is the
12

average time it takes a participant to override an automatic response and is thus considered a
measure of impulse inhibition or self-control.
The go/no go is another frequently used measure of impulse inhibition. In the go/no go
task, participants respond to a certain stimulus as fast as possible. As an example, a participant
might be told to press the left or right arrows keys on a keyboard as fast as they can when they
see a stimulus appear. However, on a certain number of trials (the no go trials), participants will
receive some cue to inhibit their responses. For example, if the stimulus is outlined in red, they
are to withhold their response. The reasoning behind this task is that on the majority of trials (go
trials) the participant can quickly and automatically respond when they see the target stimulus.
However, on a minority of trials (no go trials), the participants will have to inhibit their
automatic impulse to respond. This, like the Stroop, is considered to be a measure of self-control
because it assesses impulse inhibition.
Within the category of impulse inhibition, however, there are distinctions that are seldom
acknowledged. Friedman and Miyake (2004) identified three subcomponents of cognitive
inhibition including prepotent response inhibition, resistance to distractor interference, and
resistance to proactive interference. Prepotent response inhibition refers to acts of overriding
automatic responses, such as in the Stroop task and go/no go task. Resistance to distractor
interference refers to the ability to ignore information that is irrelevant to the task at hand, such
as in the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Resistance to proactive interference
refers to the ability to resist memory intrusions from previously cued information, such as in
cued recall tasks. The fact that these are rarely distinguished from one another and are often all
grouped under the term self-control or inhibition may, at least in part, explain the limited
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convergent validity even among these executive function tasks (r = .15; Duckworth & Kern,
2011).
Delay of gratification tasks involve presenting individuals with a choice between a
smaller immediate reward or a larger delayed reward. This paradigm was pioneered in the early
1960s when Walter Mischel and colleagues (1958; 1961) investigated individual differences in
temporal discounting among children. In a seminal work, researchers offered children a choice
between a one-cent candy and a ten-cent candy that was markedly higher in quality and
presumably more desirable. If they chose the smaller candy, children were able to receive it right
then and there, representing immediate gratification. If children wanted the larger and more
expensive candy, they were told that they would have to wait one week to receive it. Although in
this study the outcome was binary (e.g., smaller candy or larger candy), this paradigm underwent
subsequent modifications and a continuous measure was eventually developed. Later, the task
was modified such that during the delay period children were able to signal the experimenter if
they wanted to eat the smaller and less desirable reward or in some cases had the food right in
front of them and could eat it at any time (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970). This thus introduced delay
time as a continuous measure, with longer delay times being an indication of higher self-control.
Although such tasks have historically been used with children, these can be modified for
adults, which usually involves using money as the focal reward and employing longer delay
times (weeks or months). Generally, however, adjusting amount delay discounting tasks are used
with adults. Adjusting amount procedures present individuals with either hypothetical or real
choices between immediate and delayed rewards (e.g., would you rather have $7 right now or
$10 in one week) with the goal of determining individuals’ rates of delay discounting, or their
indifference point (Frye, Galizio, Friedel, DeHart, Odum, 2016; Koffarnus & Bickel, 2014;
14

Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999). As individuals are presented with increasingly large
delay times, at some point the individual will begin to prefer the smaller immediate reward over
the larger delayed reward due to the temporal distance of the delayed reward. The point at which
the individual switches to preferring the smaller immediate reward over the larger delayed
reward is known as the indifference point, since the immediate and delayed reward are equal in
terms of their subjective value. The indifference point (V) is calculated by dividing the amount
of the delayed reward (A) by the product of delay time (D) and a scaling factor (k) that represents
the individual’s rate of delay discounting (V = A/(1 + Dk); see Odum, 2011). Individuals with
lower rates of delay discounting (k) and higher indifference points are considered to have higher
self-control. Often just k, or an individual’s rate of delay discounting, is used as a measure of
self-control (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999).
Finally, persistence and willpower tasks include diverse tasks such as the cold pressor,
holding a handgrip, drinking bitter tasting drinks, persisting on impossible puzzles, completing
difficult anagrams or math problems, and food “taste tests” (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et
al., 2010; Vohs et al., 2014). In the cold pressor task, participants are instructed to hold their
hand in ice water (usually maintained between 35 and 40 degrees Fahrenheit) for as long as they
can (Mitchell, MacDonald, & Brodie, 2004). This is intended to simulate physical pain, and the
reasoning provided for using this as a measure of self-control is that it requires impulse
inhibition to endure the unpleasant stimulus of the cold water. Similar reasoning is provided for
the bitter tasting drink task and the handgrip task in that both require an individual to inhibit the
impulse to give up on an unpleasant task. In the taste test task, participants are told that they are
to judge the quality of a food item and that they may eat as much of the food item (usually
cookies or candy) that they need to in order to accurately judge its quality (Baumeister et al.,
15

1998). The dependent variable is the amount of food consumed, which ostensibly reflects selfcontrol because people with lower self-control will be less able to inhibit the impulse to continue
eating. Finally, on the impossible puzzle task, participants are presented with an extremely
difficult (or even impossible) puzzle to solve. The dependent variable is the amount of time they
persist before giving up, with greater persistence being associated with higher self-control.
Although these tests are often framed in terms of impulse inhibition (e.g., suppressing the
impulse to remove one’s hand from ice water), there is evidence that cognitive inhibition (e.g.,
the Stroop task) is distinct from behavioral inhibition (e.g., suppressing a triggered motor
response; see Engelhardt, Nigg, Carr, & Ferreira, 2008). Thus, persistence and willpower tasks
blur the lines between behavioral inhibition and cognitive inhibition. Moreover, such tasks may
confuse initiatory self-control and inhibitory self-control. For example, the food taste test may
rely more on inhibitory self-control (resisting the food), whereas the puzzle task may rely more
on initiatory self-control (actively trying to solve a puzzle). Such nuances are rarely
acknowledged but may have implications for the interpretation and generalization of results. In
subsequent analyses in this paper, persistence and willpower tasks will be split into two
categories. These will be tasks that require inhibiting an action (e.g., not eating unhealthy foods,
cold pressor) and tasks that require initiating an action (e.g., eating healthy foods, impossible
puzzle, anagrams). For a summary of self-control measures, see Table 1.
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Table 1.
A Summary of Measures of State Self-Control
Measure

Examples

Delay of Gratification/ Delay
Discounting Tasks

Monetary or food related
delay of gratification,
adjusting amount
Stroop, Go/no go, Stopsignal

Response Inhibition

Factors Assessed
Behavioral inhibition,
attention to rewards, rate of
delay discounting
Cognitive inhibition,
attention, reaction time

Resistance to Distractor
Interference

Video-watching
Cognitive inhibition,
attention control, Eriksen attention, reaction time
flanker task

Inhibitory
Persistence/Willpower Tasks

Cold Pressor, Taste Test,
Handgrip

Initiatory
Persistence/Willpower Tasks

Behavior inhibition,
resistance to unpleasant
stimuli, pain tolerance
Impossible Puzzle, Bitter Behavior initiation,
Drink, Anagrams
achievement motivation

The Structure of Self-Control
The preceding discussion illustrates the fact that self-control is a broad construct and
encompasses diverse behaviors. However, substantial inconsistencies in the self-control literature
raise questions about the dimensionality of the self-control construct. A central concern of the
present research is whether self-control is more appropriately conceptualized as a reflective
construct or a formative construct. Reflective constructs are constructs that are proposed to exist
independently of measurement and can be estimated though their effect on a variety of
indicators. In other words, causality flows from the construct (self-control) to the indicators (see
Figure 1). By contrast, a formative construct is a construct that is defined by a particular set of
indicators but has itself no causal influence on its indicators. Simply put, in a formative model
17

the latent variable is the aggregate of several indicators (see Figure 2). A common example of a
formative construct is socioeconomic status. SES does not cause education level or income but is
instead defined as the collection of such indicators.
Borsboom et al. (2003) discuss the theoretical implications of conceptualizing of a
construct as reflective or formative. Entity realism is the position that there are real constructs
such as intelligence, dominance, or aggression that create variance in behavior. Reflective
models require entity realism. To say that a construct is reflective is to say that it literally exists
and has causal influence over indicators. By contrast, a formative model would imply a
constructivist view of a psychological construct. Constructivism holds that there are not real
constructs driving behaviors but rather that constructs are just ways of classifying behaviors and
that theoretical constructs have no causal power over behaviors. Although the majority of
psychological constructs are conceptualized as reflective constructs, there is no a priori reason
why this should be the case (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003).
Self-control, like many other psychological concepts, is typically conceptualized as a
reflective construct. This is apparent both in the way that researchers discuss self-control as well
as the way researchers measure self-control. First, many researchers discuss self-control as a
single construct that, if sufficiently developed, leads to better performance on a variety of tests
such as executive function tasks, delay of gratification tasks, and persistence measures
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Hagger et al., 2010). Second, the fact that researchers try to
manipulate self-control, such as in ego-depletion paradigms, implies that they think of it as a
reflective construct. For example, ego-depletion researchers presume that exhaustion in one subdomain (e.g., resisting food) will produce changes in another sub-domain (e.g. cognitive
inhibition) by virtue of them sharing self-control as a common cause (Baumeister et al., 1998).
18

On the other hand, with formative constructs, a change in one indicator would not necessarily be
expected to produce changes in every other indicator. Third, the fact that researchers use the
various indicators of self-control interchangeably is predicated on conceptualizing self-control as
a reflective construct. In theory, indicators of a reflective construct can be used interchangeably,
whereas this is not the case for formative constructs.
I suggest here that one possible explanation for the limited convergent validity among
measures of self-control is that self-control is not a reflective construct and is instead a formative
construct. In this view, “self-control” would just be a label for grouping goal-oriented behaviors.
These behaviors would include things like impulse inhibition, distraction from tempting stimuli,
goal initiation, or any of the strategies discussed previously. It should be noted that a
constructivist approach to self-control leads to some interesting conclusions. Since formative
constructs are not thought to determine measurements, but are rather just a summary of
measurements, one is left with the proposition that changing the indicators literally changes what
the construct is. In a formative model a factor estimate is merely an index statistic (van der Maas,
Kan, & Borsboom, 2014). As an example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average is an index statistic
that is defined by the aggregate of the thirty trade reports (indicators) that make it up. The Dow
is not a reflective construct that causes the trade reports that make it up, but rather a summary of
indicators. If one were to change the indicators that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the meaning of that construct would change accordingly. If self-control is conceptualized as a
formative construct, a similar claim must be made. If the indicators that define self-control are
changed, the meaning of the self-control construct is changed. Therefore, if self-control is a
formative construct, there will be a need for researchers collectively decide which indicators
comprise self-control. Just as sociologists can all agree on what indicators comprise SES,
19

economists can all agree on what indicators comprise the Dow, and climatologists can all agree
on what indicators comprise the Air Quality Index, psychologists would need to be able to agree
on what indicators comprise self-control. This is presumably an unpalatable position and very
few people would want to claim that how self-control is defined changes based on a researcher’s
choice of measures.
There is another possibility that avoids the conclusion that self-control is defined by the
indicators that researchers choose to measure it with. It could be the case that self-control is a
hybrid construct containing elements of both reflective end formative models. In this view, selfcontrol itself could be formative, but be made up of reflective constructs such as attentional
control, inhibition of undesired behaviors, or initiation of desired behaviors (see Figure 2). This
avoids the unpalatable conclusion that self-control is literally defined by a researcher’s choice of
measures by positing that self-control, although still formative, is a collection of sub-processes
important for goal pursuit that are themselves reflective. This would mean that researchers would
still need to decide on what the important sub-domains are (e.g., cognitive inhibition, behavior
initiation, etc.), but that indicators would still be interchangeable within a sub-domain. This
would somewhat relax the requirements for what indicators need to be used, since indicators of
the same reflective construct are interchangeable. For example, if both the Stroop and the go/no
go assess inhibition, they would be interchangeable
This discussion cuts to the heart of what self-control is. As evidenced by the plethora of
measures that assess self-control (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Hagger et al., 2010) and the
numerous discussions about different strategies for exerting self-control (Fujita, 2011; Magen &
Gross, 2010), it seems that self-control is a broad construct that encompasses a wide variety of
behaviors. As argued previously, what unites these behaviors is that they are all ways of pursuing
20

long-term goals. Inhibiting impulses, initiating desirable behaviors, being selective about the
situations one puts themselves in, reconstruing the meaning of a tempting stimulus, and
distracting oneself when tempted are all strategies that people use to progress toward a long-term
goal. This means, of course, that in a formative model of self-control there would be a
considerable number and variety of indicators that should be included to comprise self-control.
As noted, one way around this is to propose a hybrid model where self-control is a formative
construct that is itself made up of reflective constructs. This avoids the conclusion that selfcontrol is defined by a researcher’s choice of measures and means that measures would be
interchangeable within a given sub-domain (Figure 2). The goal of this paper is not to provide an
exhaustive list of every sub-domain within self-control nor to provide an exhaustive list of all of
the indicators that could be used to assess reflective sub-domains, but rather to examine
relationships between some commonly used indicators and determine whether the data favor a
reflective model of self-control or a formative model. If the data should favor the latter, it will be
the task of future researchers to flesh out a complete taxonomy of self-control (e.g., what
reflective constructs need to be included in a complete model of self-control) or develop a
standardized set of indicators (much like SES or the Dow) that comprise self-control. The
unspoken assumption that self-control is a reflective construct has, to my knowledge, gone
unchallenged. Challenging this assumption constitutes the major contribution of this paper.
Coltman et al. (2008) provide detailed guidelines for determining whether a construct is
best conceptualized as reflective or formative. The way in which each of these guidelines inform
a conceptualization of self-control will be examined in turn. The first theoretical consideration
presented by Colman et al. (2008) concerns the nature of the construct. This asks whether a
construct exists or whether a construct is formed. In more precise terms, it asks whether a
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construct is defined by its indicators (formative) or whether indicators are a reflection of a real
underlying construct (reflective). The corresponding empirical consideration is to examine
indicator intercorrelations. For a reflective construct, where all indicators share a common cause,
significant intercorrelations would be expected among indicators. By contrast, indicators of a
formative construct do not necessarily have any expected pattern of intercorrelations. This is
because in a formative construct, indicators are not hypothesized to share a common cause, and
thus will not have any expected pattern of correlations.
The second theoretical consideration concerns the direction of causality from the latent
factor to the indicators. If variance in the latent construct theoretically creates variance in the
indicators, then it is a reflective construct. If the indicators cause changes in the construct, then it
is formative. In the context of self-control, the question would be whether changes in self-control
produce changes in things like impulse inhibition, planning, and goal initiation or whether
changes in these factors cause changes in self-control. This is also noted by Edwards and
Bagozzi (2000) who suggest considering temporal precedence to determine whether a construct
is reflective or formative. If a change in the construct is proposed to cause a change in its
indicators, then it is reflective. This is the assumption in ego-depletion paradigms, where selfcontrol is manipulated through an exhausting task and then measured using some indicator.
However, one could take an alternative position and suppose that changes in things like impulse
inhibition and persistence instead cause changes in self-control. This would be consistent with a
formative model.
The next empirical consideration suggested by Coltman et al. (2008) is to examine
indicator relationships with construct antecedents and consequences. Assume for a moment that
self-control is a reflective construct, and that changes in self-control are expected to produce
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changes in a variety of domains such as school or work performance, substance use, financial
stability, and health behaviors. Since under a reflective model each indicator is a reflection of
self-control, one would expect each individual indicator to be able to predict the same outcomes
as the latent construct itself. In simpler terms, if self-control theoretically leads to a particular
outcome, and a particular indicator assesses self-control, then one would expect that indicator to
also predict that particular outcome. By contrast, if self-control were a formative construct, this
would not need to be the case. It could be the case that certain indicators only predict certain
types of outcomes and not others. In fact, this already appears to be the case based on the
findings of de Ridder et al. (2011) who found that inhibitory and initiatory self-control predicted
different behaviors.
The final theoretical consideration is the treatment of measurement error. In reflective
models, factor analysis can be used to identify and extract out the measurement error of the
construct. This is possible because in reflective models, observed scores are indicators of a latent
factor, and thus measurement error in the latent factor can be determined by examining the
variance in the factor not accounted for by the indicators. In formative models, it is not possible
to account for measurement error in the latent factor. This is because each indicator is not caused
by the same factor, but rather each indicator has its own set of factors that influence it and bring
with them their own unique sources of variance. There are no constraints on the covariances
among indicators in a formative model.
The fact that reflective models and formative models treat sources of error differently
allows for a test of model specification called the vanishing tetrad test (Bollen & Ting, 2000).
The tetrad test works by examining the differences between the products of pairs of covariances.

23

For any four indicators, there are six covariances and it is possible to form three sets, or tetrads,
that may be tested. For example, for the indicators a, b, c, and d, the tetrads are as follows:
Tabcd = σabσcd - σacσbd
Tacdb = σacσdb - σadσcb
Tadbc = σadσbc - σabσdc
In these equations, σ is equal to the population covariance of the two variables that are indexed
below it. Vanishing tetrads, implied by reflective models, mean that Tabcd = 0. By contrast,
tetrads not equal to zero would imply that each set of covariances have unique sources of
variance and would thus be most consistent with a formative model.
Based on the theoretical and empirical considerations presented above, the following
section will critically evaluate two different models of self-control. The first model (Figure 1) is
a reflective model of self-control and is arguably the model currently preferred by researchers in
the field. Under this model, self-control is a psychological construct that has causal influence
over a diverse range of behaviors including impulse inhibition, planning, attention deployment,
goal initiation, delay of gratification, and persistence. The second model (Figure 2) is a formative
model of self-control.
Based on which model most closely resembles the true structure of self-control, different
patterns in the data are expected. If self-control is a reflective construct, with all indicators
sharing self-control as a common cause, one would expect to see substantial correlations both
between different individual indicators as well as between sub-domains. By contrast, in the
formative model one would not necessarily expect correlations between the different domains.
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However, one would still expect correlations among indicators of the same sub-domain since
these are still represented as reflective constructs.
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Figure 1. Reflective Model of Self-Control
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Figure 2. Hybrid Model of Self-Control
Previous Evidence for Convergent Validity
The first empirical consideration suggested by Coltman et al. (2008) is to examine
indicator intercorrelations. This is essentially a question of convergent validity. If indicators do
not correlate, there is no way for them to be meaningfully assessing the same reflective
construct. Under a formative model, however, there would be no expected pattern of correlations
between the different indicators. By and large, this is what the available data show. In a metaanalysis of self-control measurement, Duckworth and Kern (2011) examined relationships
between self-report measures, impulse inhibition measures, and delay of gratification tasks. Low
correlations were observed between each type of measurement ranging from r = .10 to r = .15.
Although these correlations were significant, the small magnitude of these relationships casts
26

doubt on the comparability of such measures. In fact, the small magnitude of these relationships
may well be interpreted as effectively meaningless due to what Paul Meehl (1990) called the
“crud factor”. The crud factor is a phenomenon in the social sciences such that, given sufficient
sample size, everything correlates with everything else. This is due to the fact that in the social
sciences, measured traits are affected by shared background characteristics such as upbringing,
genetics, social and cultural environment, nutrition, and numerous other unmeasured variables.
Therefore, the pattern of low correlations observed between behavioral measures of self-control
cannot safely be interpreted as evidence of convergent validity, but rather noise or “crud” that is
produced by shared background variables. Indeed, this pattern of low or non-existent correlations
between various measures of self-control would be most consistent with a formative model of
self-control, rather than a reflective model.
In addition to the meta-analysis conducted by Duckworth and Kern (2011), numerous
other researchers have taken up the task of examining the convergent validity of self-control
measures, with relatively similar findings. Reynolds et al. (2006) examined relationships
between four behavioral measures of self-control, which included a stop signal task, the go/no-go
task, a computerized delay discounting procedure, and the balloon analogue risk task (which
involves earning money to blow up a balloon that could pop at any time and result in a loss of
earnings). The researchers also administered three self-report measures of impulsivity, including
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995), the I7 (Eysenck et al., 1985), and the
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Patrick, Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002). Although
correlations between self-report measures were high, correlations between self-report measures
and behavioral measures were low and largely non-significant. Moreover, the various behavioral
measures did not correlate with one another and loaded on two separate factors labeled by the
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researchers as impulsive disinhibition (stop signal task and go/no go) and impulsive decision
making (delay of gratification and risk taking), highlighting the danger of grouping these
measures under the global term “self-control.”
In a similar study, researchers administered four self-report measures of impulsivity and
five behavioral measures. The four self-report measures included the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(Patton et al., 1995), the I7 (Eysenck et al., 1985), the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (Dickman,
1990), and the Wender Utah Rating Scale (Ward, Wender, & Reimherr, 1993). The five
behavioral measures included a delay of gratification choice task, a delay discounting task in
which participants made hypothetical choices between monetary rewards, a contingent delay
discounting task in which participants had an opportunity to receive the rewards they selected, a
response inhibition task that required participants to wait a set amount of time before responding
to a stimulus, and a digit span recognition task. The results showed a pattern of low and nonsignificant correlations between self-report measures and behavioral measures, as well as no
significant relationships between the various behavioral measures (Lane, Cherek, Rhodes,
Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003). Like Reynolds et al. (2011), these researchers found that
behavioral tasks loaded onto two factors that they labeled as response inhibition and delay of
reward.
Numerous other studies have reported similar findings. White et al. (1994) examined
relationships between measures, such as the Stroop task, the Trail Making Test, a card playing
task, a circle tracing task, a delay of gratification task, and self-reported impulsivity, and found
that performance on these measures was generally unrelated. In other studies, self-reported selfcontrol has been unrelated to performance on the go/no go and delay of gratification tasks
(Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000; Fine, Steinberg, Frick, & Cauffman, 2016). Taken together,
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the results of these studies suggest that measures of self-control relate only minimally to one
another, if at all, which would be most consistent with a formative model of self-control rather
than a reflective model.
A final piece of evidence comes from research by Steimke et al. (2016). In this study,
researchers administered a spatial attentional cueing task, the Stroop task, an unsolvable anagram
task, and a delay of gratification task using chocolate. The cueing task required that participants
identify a target letter amidst either aversive (disgusting), tempting (erotic), or neutral distractors.
Using eye-tracking data, the researchers were able to examine the effect of aversion, temptation,
and neutral distraction on task performance. The results of this research showed that the ability to
endure aversion, resist temptations and ignore neutral distractions are independent of each other.
This is especially relevant to the present discussion because it highlights the fact that self-control
is not necessarily a singular construct and avoiding something is not the same as engaging with
something. However, the researchers did find that although the unsolvable anagram task did not
correlate with the cueing task, the Stroop and the delay of gratification task did correlate. Still,
the fact that the different strategies are separable would be more indicative of a formative model.
To summarize, a growing body of research suggests that various behavioral measures of
self-control only relate minimally to one another. Under a reflective model of self-control, where
the different indicators are thought to reflect variance in a single underlying construct, the
different measures would be theoretically interchangeable. This appears to be the dominant
conceptualization of self-control, as evidenced by studies that use these different measures
interchangeably and interpret the results indiscriminately as levels of self-control (Baumeister et
al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010; Vohs et al., 2014). The assumption that such diverse tasks may be
used interchangeably as measures of self-control has gone largely unchallenged. However, the
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available data suggests that this may not be the case, which casts doubt on the comparability of
results across studies using different measures of self-control. The low correlations reported
between the various measures, which can hardly be interpreted as more than “crud” (Meehl,
1990), would be most consistent with a formative model of self-control. Although each of these
may be processes involved in the pursuit of long-term goals, it is likely that none of them on
their own capture the entire construct of self-control. Thus, results using different measures may
be incomparable and researchers should be wary of using such measures interchangeably as tests
of global self-control.
Absent from the discussion thus far is the use of persistence and willpower measures to
assess self-control. These measures, such as the cold pressor or handgrip task, are frequently
used in ego-depletion paradigms. The rationale generally provided is that these tasks involve
impulse inhibition. However, such measures differ from the computerized cognitive inhibition
tasks in a few important ways. First, persistence and willpower tasks may assess behavioral
inhibition rather than cognitive inhibition due to the fact that many of these tasks are
behaviorally based (e.g., handgrip or cold pressor). This is an important distinction as research
suggests that behavioral inhibition and cognitive inhibition are distinct constructs and should be
considered separately in research (Engelhardt et al., 2008; Harnishfeger, 1995). Second, various
strategies of self-control may be used in persistence and willpower tasks, such as distraction,
planning, or cognitive change. By contrast, cognitive inhibition tasks limit participants to the use
of only one strategy and thus may underestimate self-control. For example, thinking about
something else may be an effective strategy for persisting on the cold pressor task, and in my
own research I frequently observe participants trying to distract themselves during this task (e.g.,
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foot tapping, talking, looking elsewhere in the room). On the other hand, distraction would not
be an effective strategy for improving performance on the go/no go task or Stroop task.
For these reasons, persistence and willpower tasks may more closely resemble real-life
acts of self-control because they can involve both inhibition and initiation, allow the use of
multiple strategies of goal-pursuit, and are closer in kind to the self-control challenges that
people face on a daily basis. Thus, such measures may theoretically appreciate higher ecological
validity than computerized inhibition tasks. However, despite some conceptual advantages,
persistence and willpower tasks have not been validated as indicators of self-control. To my
knowledge, only one study has directly examined the relationship between performance on such
tasks and self-reported self-control. Schmeichel and Zell (2007) conducted two studies and found
that participants who scored higher on the Self-Control Scale were more able to refrain from
blinking during a two-minute period as well as persisted longer on the cold pressor task.
Although these findings show that persistence and willpower tasks may assess important
components of self-control, more extensive research is needed to draw sound conclusions
(Lurquin & Miyake, 2017). This will be another major contribution of the current work.
Previous Evidence for Predictive Validity
When differentiating between a reflective and a formative construct, Coltman et al.
(2008) also suggest examining indicator relationships with the theoretical antecedents and
consequences of a construct. This essentially concerns predictive validity. If self-control were a
reflective construct, one would expect the indicators to predict theoretically implicated outcomes
with similar efficacy due to them all sharing a common cause. If self-control were a formative
construct there would not necessarily be any expected pattern in terms of what indicators predict
what outcomes. In more concrete terms, under a reflective model of self-control one would
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expect impulse inhibition, delay of gratification, and persistence indicators to predict similar
consequences (e.g. GPA, drug use, health behaviors, spending) by virtue of sharing self-control
as a common cause. If self-control were a formative construct, one might instead expect certain
domains to predict certain behaviors and other domains predict different behaviors. For example,
perhaps impulse inhibition would be a better predictor of drug use and delay of gratification
would be a better predictor of saving money. The following section will examine each type of
measure in terms of predictive validity and consider whether the data support a reflective or a
formative model of self-control.
Regarding the predictive validity of cognitive inhibition tasks, there is mixed evidence.
Sharma, Markon, and Clark (2014) conducted a meta-analysis examining relationships between
self-report measures of impulsivity, laboratory tests of impulsivity, and daily life behaviors. The
behavioral measures included in the analysis were the Stroop Task, the go/ no go task, the stop
signal task, the Iowa Gambling Task, and the Wisconsin Card Sort Task. The daily life outcomes
assessed included measures of drug, alcohol and tobacco use as well as aggression, gambling,
and sex. The meta-analysis revealed that, on the whole, behavioral measures were weakly or
insignificantly related to daily life behaviors. One exception was the Stroop Task, which
correlated with alcohol use, aggression, and gambling. Moreover, behavioral measures of
impulsivity loaded on different factors labelled inattention, inhibitory dyscontrol, impulsive
decision making, and set shifting.
Other researchers have reported similar findings. White et al. (1994), discussed
previously, found that scores on cognitive tasks were either weakly or insignificantly related to
parent and teacher ratings of impulsivity as well as delinquency at ages ten and thirteen. In one
study of adolescent criminal behavior, the go/no go did not reliably predict self-reported self32

control or long-term self-reported offending, but go/no-go times were significantly correlated
with short-term self-reported offending (Fine, Steinberg, Frick, & Cauffman, 2016). By contrast,
Crean et al. (2000) found no evidence that performance on the go/no-go could distinguish
between low-risk and high-risk psychiatric outpatients. Overall, evidence of the predictive
validity of cognitive inhibition tasks is sparse.
With regard to delay of gratification tasks, evidence of predictive validity has also been
mixed. On one hand, there are researchers who have not had success using delay of gratification
tasks to meaningfully predict behavioral outcomes. In the meta-analysis presented above
(Sharma et al., 2014), delay tasks were only successful in predicting tobacco use, gambling, and
sex. White et al. (1994) found that a delay of gratification task was unsuccessful in predicting
delinquency, although it was related to teacher-rated impulsivity and patience/persistence.
Similarly, Lane et al. (2003) included two delay discounting tasks in their study and found that it
did not relate significantly to any of the other indicators of impulsivity except the
Attention/Impulsivity subscale of the Wender Utah Rating Scale (Ward et al., 1993). This is,
however, a pattern of correlations one might expect under a formative model of self-control.
Some of these tasks may predict some outcomes better than other tasks due to the specific
domain tapped by the task and the specific demands of the outcomes of interest.
Showing support for the predictive validity of delay of gratification tasks, Mischel and
colleagues (1988; 1989) conducted several follow-up studies of the children included in their
original delay of gratification experiments (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Ebbesen, &
Zeiss, 1972). Children who were better at delay of gratification tasks at ages four and five
displayed more positive life outcomes as adolescents, such as higher academic, verbal, and social
competence and were more rational and attentive. For example, children with longer delay times
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were later found to have higher SAT scores, lower likelihood of obesity, better social skills, and
fewer risk taking behaviors, such as gambling and drug use (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988;
Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Mischel et al., 1989; Reynolds, 2006). Even as adults,
participants who performed well on childhood delay of gratification tests had higher educational
attainment, higher sense of self-worth, better responses to stress, and less drug use (Ayduk et al.,
2000; Mischel et al., 2011). Reynolds et al. (2004) have also conducted studies examining the
predictive validity of delay of gratification tasks. In one study, the researchers were able to show
that rates of delay discounting distinguished between smokers and non-smokers, with smokers
being significantly higher in delay discounting (Reynolds et al., 2004). In yet another study,
longer delay times were associated with better achievement test scores, higher GPA, lower BMI,
and less risky behavior (Duckworth et al., 2013).
Other researchers have found similar associations between the ability to delay
gratification and outcomes theoretically associated with self-control (Reyna & Wilhelms, 2017;
Reynolds, 2006; Watson & Milfont, 2017), suggesting that delay of gratification tasks do have
reasonable predictive validity. This could be because in delay of gratification tasks, individuals
can sometimes use other strategies besides impulse inhibition, such as distraction from the
tempting stimulus, cognitive change, or situation modification, to aid in obtaining the delayed
reward. For example, presenting children with toys or another way to distract themselves during
the delay period has been shown to increase delay times (Mischel et al., 1972; Peake, Hebl, &
Mischel, 2002; Sethi et al., 2000). Indeed, anyone who has observed children trying to resist
eating a marshmallow has probably noticed the use of the self-control strategies the children
employ (e.g., looking elsewhere in the room, singing/talking to themselves, rocking back and
forth in the chair). Individuals who are especially adept at using such strategies may perform
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better on delay of gratification tasks, but these differences would be undetectable if using
measures of cognitive inhibition.
The studies presented above show that the different measures of self-control
inconsistently predict the theoretical consequences of the construct, which would be most
consistent with a formative model. Long-term goals may be pursued through a variety of means,
such as impulse inhibition, situation selection, situation modification, distraction, forming
implementation intentions, goal initiation, and cognitive change. Some of these may be more
effective for certain types of goal pursuit than others, and the notion that self-control is a single
construct that determines behavior in all of these domains may be inaccurate.
Although all of these strategies may be ways that individuals pursue long-term goals,
being adept at using just one or a few of these strategies may suffice. For example, an individual
who is adept at avoiding tempting situations and surrounds themselves with other similarly
responsible individuals will not have to use impulse inhibition as much as someone who places
themselves in situations where temptations are frequent. In this way, self-control would not drive
behavior in a variety of domains, but rather behavior one or a few domains would drive selfcontrol. It may be that self-control is additive in the sense that if an individual is sufficiently
skilled in one or a few of these strategies, they are labelled as having “high self-control”. An
analogy can again be taken from economics. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is comprised of
trade reports of thirty large U.S. companies. This means that a minority of those companies can
dip, but so long as the majority are doing well the Dow will indicate economic growth. In the
context of self-control, an individual could be poor as using a few strategies (say, poor impulse
inhibition), but as long as they are sufficiently skilled at a some of the strategies of goal pursuit
(say, situation selection and goal initiation), then they will appear as having high self-control.
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In establishing the construct validity of a psychological test, Cronbach and Meehl (1955)
discuss the nomological network. A nomological network is an interlocking system of constructs
and observables that are theoretically linked to one another. In order to establish that a measure
has construct validity, a nomological network must be developed for the measure. Cronbach and
Meehl hold that a rigorous chain of induction is needed to determine the degree to which a
construct behaves the way that it should in a nomological network. Given that self-control is not
directly observable and has no definite criterion (“gold standard”) by which to judge it, selfcontrol must be inferred based on relationships between variables in a nomological network. It
should be noted, however, that the logic of establishing nomological validity in this way only
works for reflective constructs. For formative constructs, where there is not necessarily any
expected pattern of correlations between indicators, the logic of establishing nomological
validity (which is based on examining expected patterns of correlations between constructs and
observables) breaks down. As Cronbach and Meehl (1955; p. 287) state “if the obtained
correlation departs from the expectation, however, there is no way to know whether the fault lies
in test A, test B, or the formulation of the construct.” The goal of the present research is to
examine the possibility that, in the case of self-control, the problem lies with the formulation of
the construct. I propose that self-control is not a reflective construct but rather a formative
construct. As such, standard procedures used in the psychological sciences to establish construct
validity (e.g., examining the nomological network, factor analysis) have been and will continue
to be fruitless endeavors.
Current Study
The primary goal of the present study is to determine whether self-control is more
appropriately conceptualized as a reflective construct or a formative construct. To do so, three
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smaller goals will be set. First, as suggested by Coltman et al. (2008), indicator intercorrelations
will be examined. Under a reflective model, high indicator intercorrelations would be expected.
Under a formative model, high indicator intercorrelations would only be expected within each
reflective sub-domain (e.g., correlations between measures of cognitive inhibition), but not
across sub-domains. Second, this research will examine indicator relationships with the
theoretical consequences of self-control. If self-control is a reflective construct, all indicators
should correlate with the theoretically implicated consequences of self-control such as GPA,
health behaviors, spending, and drug use. If self-control is a formative construct, indicators may
relate to outcomes differentially. Third, the vanishing tetrad test will be applied to sub-domain
factor scores. In order to do this, structural equation modeling will be used to produce a factor
covariance matrix (with each factor corresponding to one of the sub-domains identified in
Figures 1 and 2). The resulting covariance matrix will be submitted to a vanishing tetrad test. If
the resulting tetrads are not significantly different from zero, this will be evidence of a reflective
model. If the tetrads are significantly different from zero, this will be evidence of a formative
model. The vanishing tetrad test will not be applied to every possible tetrad of indicators for two
reasons. First, the number of sets of tetrads for models with n observed indicators is n!/(n-4)!4!
(Bollen & Ting, 2000). This means that for thirteen tests of self-control, there would be 715 sets
of tetrads, or 2145 implied vanishing tetrads. Second, given that some measures of self-control
share reflective sub-domains (e.g., the Stroop, go/no go, and flanker all being indicators of
cognitive inhibition), some covariance tetrads (within a sub-domain) would be expected to
vanish, while others (across sub-domains) would not be expected to vanish. This would muddy
the interpretation of the results since some tetrads would vanish and others would not. Due to
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these reasons, I have decided to reduce the number of indicators and use the factor covariance
matrix to perform the vanishing tetrad test.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
Power Analysis
In order to estimate the number of participants needed to detect relationships between
measures, correlations from previous studies of convergent validity were examined. Based on
research by Duckworth and Kern (2010), Saunders et al. (2017), Reynolds et al. (2006), Lane et
al. (2003), Schmeichel and Zell (2007) and White et al. (1994), correlations were estimated.
Table 2 summarizes previous work on convergent validity. Based on the results of previous
studies, correlations between different measures range from small and non-significant up to as
high as .35. Based on this level of inconsistency, I chose a conservative estimate of effect size
and calculated the sample size needed to detect a significant correlation of r = .20 between any
two given measures. The necessary sample size needed to detect correlations as low as .20 at
80% power is n = 192. Therefore, target enrollment is 200 participants. Power analysis was
conducted using the R package “pwr” (Champely, 2018).
Participants
Participants were 197 undergraduate students recruited from a public university in the
southeastern United States. However, data from 6 participants was discarded due to errors in data
collection or non-compliance with study instructions, leaving a final sample of 191. The majority
of participants were female (61.3% female, 32.5% male, .5% transgender, and 5.7% declined to
identify). The majority of participants were also Caucasian (80.1% Caucasian, 6.8% Black, 4.7%
Hispanic/Latino, 8.4% other) and had a mean age of 19.7 (SD = 3.7). Research participation was
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incentivized by offering 3 research credits for participation, which could be exchanged for extra
credit in a psychology course.
Table 2.
Summary of Effect Sizes Used to Estimate Effect Size for Power Analysis
Self-report
Self-report

Impulse inhibition/
Executive function

Delay of gratification/
Discounting

r = .50 (Duckworth & Kern,
2011)
r = -.03 - .81 (Lane et al.,
2003)

Impulse inhibition/
Executive function

r = .10 (Duckworth & Kern,
2011)

r = .15 (Duckworth &
Kern, 2011)

r = -2.0 - .254 (Reynolds,
Ortengren, Richards, & de
Wit, 2006)

r = .14 (Lane et al.,
2003)

r = -.012 - .013 (Saunders et
al., 2017)
Delay of gratification/
Discounting

Persistence/ Willpower

r = .15 (Duckworth & Kern,
2011)

r = .11 (Duckworth &
Kern, 2011)

r = .21 (Duckworth &
Kern, 2011)

r = -.230 - .170 (Reynolds,
Ortengren, Richards, & de
Wit, 2006)

r = -.18 - .23 (Lane et
al., 2003)

r = .25 (Lane et al.,
2003)

r = .08 (White et al., 1994)

r = -.03 - .22 (White et
al., 1994)

r = .28 (Schmeichel, & Zell,
2007)

r = .09 (White et al.,
1994)

r = .17 (White et al.,
1994)

r = -.34 (Schmeichel, & Zell,
2007)

Procedure
Participants first completed the behavioral measures of self-control in a randomized
order. These included the Stroop task, the go/no go task, the flanker task, the cueing task, the
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handgrip task, the cold pressor, the taste test, the Iowa Gambling Task, and impossible puzzle
tasks. Next, participants completed the survey portion of the study, which included the SelfControl Scale (α = .800), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (α = .841), the Achievement motives
Scale (α = .835 for the motive to achieve subscale; α = .807 for the motive to avoid failure
subscale), the AUDIT (α = .787), the Financial Stress Questionnaire (α = .921), the Weight
Concerns Scale (α = .768), the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (α = .929), an impulse spending
questionnaire (α = .887), and self-report measures of other outcomes such as GPA, health
behaviors, and drug use. Finally, delay of gratification was assessed at the end of the study. This
had to be assessed last due to the nature of the focal reward being used, as explained below. See
Table 3 for descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for all self-report variables.
Academic and Health Behaviors
First, academic performance was assessed via GPA. To ensure accuracy, participants
were asked to log into their university account and view their GPA digitally, rather than estimate
it. Next, participants completed surveys related to food, exercise, spending, and substance use
behaviors. To assess food-related health behaviors, items were drawn from the Health-Related
Behavior Questionnaire developed by the Schools Health Education Unit (Balding, 2008). This
scale assesses the frequency with which certain healthy and unhealthy foods are consumed.
Substance use was assessed using items from the Alcohol, Smoking, and Substance Involvement
Screening Test (Ali et al., 2002). To assess exercise related behaviors, the very short Leisure
Time Exercise Questionnaire (Godin & Shephard, 1985) was used. To assess impulse spending
behavior, items were drawn from a survey developed by Güre (2012). For the list of health- and
drug-related behavior questions, see Appendix E. Due to the fact that alcohol is more accessible
than other drugs and people are expected to encounter alcohol-related temptations more
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frequently than other drugs, I also chose to include the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test
(AUDIT). This is a 10-item questionnaire that assesses the frequency of alcohol use as well as
some of the thoughts and emotions surrounding alcohol use (Saunders, Aasland, Babor, de la
Fuente, & Grant, 1993). For the AUDIT, see Appendix H.
Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Variables
Measure Mean

SD

Min

Max

Reliability

3.26

.60

1.69

4.77

α = .800

Barratt Impulsiveness 2.91

.37

1.53

3.87

α = .841

Self-Control Scale

Weight Concerns

2.64

1.06

1.00

5.20

α = .768

Impulse Shopping

1.30

.38

1.00

5.00

α = .887

Financial Stress

3.80

.83

1.67

5.00

α = .921

Motive to Achieve

4.21

.59

2.40

5.00

α = .835

Motive to Avoid Fail

3.67

.85

1.00

5.00

α = .807

AUDIT

1.30

.83

1.00

2.70

α = .787

Exercise

2.49

1.04

1.00

5.00

α = .599

Healthy Food

4.69

1.04

1.60

7.00

α = .750

Unhealthy Food

3.98

1.04

1.50

6.50

α = .621

Self-Reported Self-Control
Two different self-report measures of self-control were administered. These included the
Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al.,
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1995). To view each of these scales, see Appendices B and C. The Brief Self-Control Scale is a
13-item inventory that assesses dimensions of self-control such as restraint and impulsivity. For a
factor analysis of this scale, see Maloney et al. (2012). Items on this scale are ranked on a fivepoint Likert scale ranging from not at all like me to very much like me. Participants reported on
how often they display behaviors, such as saying inappropriate things or indulging in
temptations, and indicated whether they have trouble breaking bad habits or working toward
long-term goals (e.g., “Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done”). The SelfControl Scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability in past research (α = .83 - .85; see Tangney
et al., 2004), as well as in the present research (α = .800). This scale has also demonstrated
evidence of predictive validity in previous investigations by being able to predict higher grade
point average, fewer problems regulating eating, and lower rates of anxiety and depression
(Lindner, Nagy, & Retelsdorf, 2015; Tangney et al., 2004).
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995) is a 30-item scale that assesses
different dimensions of impulsiveness. First-order factors assessed include attention, cognitive
instability, motor impulsiveness, perseverance, self-control, and cognitive complexity. Of
particular interest in the current study is the self-control subscale, which is composed of 6 items.
Responses are scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from rarely/never to almost always.
Examples items include “I plan tasks carefully,” “I buy things on impulse,” and “I am restless at
the theater or lectures.” Since this scale measures impulsiveness, higher scores indicate lower
self-control. Examination of this scale has shown acceptable internal consistency in multiple
samples (α = .79 - .83; see Patton et al., 1995), as well as in the present sample (α = .841 for the
full scale; α = .758 for the self-control subscale). Subsequent analyses were performed on both
the full scale and the self-control subscale on its own.
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Attentional Control
Four cognitive inhibition tasks were used in the present study. All of these tasks were
programmed and administered using PsyToolkit (Stoet, 2017), a digital platform for developing
psychological tests. The four inhibition tasks were the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the go/no-go
task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), and the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and a spatial cueing
task (Posner, 1980). In principle, these tasks require impulse inhibition in order to override an
incorrect automatic response and provide a correct response. For example, the Stroop task elicits
competition between visual and language systems by presenting people with the words of colors
that are printed in different colors and asking them to name the color of the font instead of what
the word says. This requires individuals to override their initial impulse to read the word and
instead correctly name the color of the font. Similarly, on a certain number of trials on the go/no
go task (e.g., the no go trials), individuals must inhibit the impulse to respond when the no go
stimulus is present.
The Stroop Task was administered through a web browser using code developed by
PsyToolkit. After having the instructions explained to them, participants completed 150
computerized trials of the Stroop task, which took approximately 5 minutes. On this task,
approximately 50% of the trials were congruent trials and 50% were incongruent trials.
Responses were made using a keyboard with participants pressing “r” for red, “g” for green, “b”
for blue, and “y” for yellow. At the end of 150 trials, the researcher recorded reaction time (ms)
on congruent trials, reaction time on incongruent trials, and the Stroop interference score. The
interference score, or the time it takes a participant to override the impulse to read the word, was
calculated by subtracting average reaction time on congruent trials from average reaction time on
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incongruent trials. This was calculated for only the trials on which participants responded
correctly. In the current sample, the average Stroop effect was 113.73ms (SD = 64.81ms).
Participants also completed 100 trials of a modified go/no go task. This task was split into
two portions. The first portion was training, where participants responded to a stimulus using the
right and left keys. For this portion, an arrow appeared in the middle of the screen either pointing
left or pointing right. If it was pointing left the participant was to hit the left key within 500
milliseconds and if the arrow was pointing right the participant was to press the right key within
500 milliseconds. There were not any no go trials in the training. To move on from the training,
participants had to either get 20 correct in a row or complete 50 total. For the second part,
participants were given additional instructions. On a certain portion of the trials (30%), the arrow
had a red ring around it (e.g., the no go stimulus) which indicated that they should not respond.
This meant that when the red circle was present, the participants had to inhibit their dominant
response and not press one of the arrow keys. There were 100 trials (30 no go/ 70 go). The
proportion of no go trials on which the participant did respond was recorded as a measure of
impulsivity. This is preferred to just using the overall percent correct because trials on which the
participants were supposed to respond but did not respond (or responded incorrectly) do not
constitute as impulsivity. Only trials on which the participant was not supposed to respond but
did respond (e.g., errors of commission) constitute impulsive behavior. This decision was made
based on previous research showing that errors of omission relate to inattention, whereas errors
of commission relate significantly to symptom counts of impulsivity (Bezdjian, Baker, Lozano,
& Raine, 2009). Since this is a study about impulsivity, errors of commission were the primary
outcome of interest. In the current study, the average number of errors of commission was 3.71
(SD = 2.91; min = 0, max = 15).
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The flanker task was originally developed to study the effect of irrelevant or distracting
stimuli on responses to a target stimulus (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In this task, participants
were tasked with discriminating between two sets of stimuli. In the present study, participants
saw one of four letters flash in the middle of the screen. If the letter was an X or a C, they were
to press the number 1. If the letter was a V or a B, they were to press the number 0. On these
trials, irrelevant distractor letters were presented alongside the target letter. The participant
therefore had to ignore the distractors in order to correctly respond to the target letter. On some
of the trials, the distractors corresponded to the target stimuli (e.g., X flanked by X or C). On
other trials, the distractors corresponded to a response contrary to the target letter (e.g., X flanked
by V or B). Much like the Stroop task, participants reliably respond faster and more accurately
when the target letter is flanked by a letter that corresponds to the same response, rather than
letters that corresponds to the opposite response. The difference in reaction time between the
congruent and incongruent trials is the flanker effect and was used as a measure of impulse
inhibition in the present study. This is a measure of impulse inhibition because it represents the
amount of time it took the participants to override interference from the incorrect distractors and
correctly respond. Participants completed 150 flanker trials, which took approximately 5
minutes. The average flanker effect was 25.97ms (SD = 39.37ms)
The Posner cueing task (Posner, 1980) was developed to test the effect of attentional
cueing on reaction time to a target stimulus. In this task, participants were shown two boxes. In
one of the boxes, a “GO” signal appeared. If the signal appeared on the left, the participants was
to press the left key. If it appeared on the right, the participant was to press the right key. On the
majority of trials, a small “X” flashed on the side of the screen that the “GO” signal was about to
appear. This conditioned the participants to cue their attention to the side of the screen on which
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the “X” had just flashed. However, on a minority of trials (invalid cues; roughly 30%), the cue
appeared on the opposite side of the screen than where the “GO” signal would appear. To
correctly respond on the invalid cue trials, the participants had to override the cued information
and alter their response. As a result, participants took reliably longer to respond on invalid cue
trials than on the valid cue trials. The difference between the average response time on valid and
invalid trials represents the amount of time it takes the participant to override the incorrect cue
and may thus be considered a measure of impulse inhibition. Versions of this task have been
used to assess self-control in the past (Bartholdy, Cheng, Schmidt, Campbell, & O'Daly, 2016;
Steimke et al., 2016). In the present study, the average cueing effect was 71.24ms (SD = 55.13).
In other words, participants took on average 71ms longer to respond when their attention had
been cued to the invalid position.
Attention to Distal Rewards
To assess individual’s willingness to delay immediate gratification in favor of larger
rewards the Monetary Choice Questionnaire was used (Kirby et al., 1999). This is a 27-item
questionnaire wherein participants must choose between hypothetical rewards delayed over
varying amounts of time. An example item is “would you prefer to have $55 today or $75 in 61
days?.” Delay discounting was examined by calculating k. k ranges from .00016 to .25, and
lower values represent lower rates of delay discounting, or higher self-control. This was
calculated based on the procedure outlined by of Kirby et al. (1999). k can be estimated based on
a participant’s pattern of responses to the questions on the Monetary Choice Questionnaire. For
example, question 23 asks “would you prefer $41 today, or $75 in 20 days?.” A participant with
a discount rate (k) of .041 would be indifferent between these two rewards, so if a participant
chooses the delayed reward one could infer that their k is less than .041. Question 21 asks
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“would you prefer $34 today, or $50 in 30 days?,” and a participant who is indifferent between
these two rewards would have a k of .016. If they selected the immediate reward, it can be
inferred that they have k greater than .016. This would then narrow the estimate of k to between
.016 and .041. Next, Kirby et al. (1999) suggest taking the geometric mean of these numbers to
avoid underweighting the smaller of the two discounting rates. In this example, the estimated k
would be equal to .0256. Although these can be calculated by hand, the popularity of this scale
has led to the creation of programs and spreadsheets that will estimate k values automatically.
Gray et al. (2016) provide R and SPSS syntax for estimating k, which was utilized in the current
study. In the present sample, the average k was .02319 (SD = .03605). This indicates that, on
average, participants in this sample had moderate rates of delay discounting.
In addition to the delay discounting task, participants also completed a delay of
gratification task. This task was designed to resemble the experiments carried out by Mischel and
colleagues (1958; 1961; 1970; 1972; 1988; 1989) wherein participants were presented with an
option between a less desirable but immediate reward or a more desirable but delayed reward.
However, because the sample in the current study was comprised of college students, the focal
reward used was not food but instead research credits. The decision to not use food was made
because adults vary widely in the intensity of their food and weight related goals, meaning food
would not elicit a goal conflict of equal strength among participants. By contrast, it is a
comparatively safer assumption that participants enrolled in our study are motivated to obtain
research credits. This is because at the university in which this research is being conducted,
students are able to exchange research credits for extra credit in courses and this constitutes the
primary way that research participation is incentivized. Since participants were not offered any
incentive besides research credits for engaging in this study, it is a safe assumption that all
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participants enrolled in the current study were, by virtue of signing up in the first place,
motivated to obtain research credits. Since it is also a safe assumption that college students value
their time, presenting them with a choice between leaving immediately (but earning less credits)
or staying longer (and earing more credits) represents a direct conflict between an immediately
gratifying option with a smaller reward or a delayed option with a larger reward.
Therefore, for the delay task, participants were presented with three options at the end of
the study. The first option (immediate gratification option) was to be awarded the three research
credits they had earned and be allowed to leave immediately. The second option (intermediate
gratification) was to stay in the study for an additional half-hour completing extra surveys but
receive an additional half research credit (3.5 total) in return. The third option (delayed
gratification) was to stay in the study for an additional hour of surveys but receive an additional
full research credit (4 total) in return. This directly assessed participants’ willingness to sacrifice
an immediate desire (leaving early) in favor of a longer-term goal (extra credit in a course). To
ensure that participants’ decisions were not affected by scheduling conflicts, all participants were
told to allow at least three hours for the study. In the current sample, 54.5% chose to leave
immediately, 11% chose to stay for an extra half credit, and 34.5% chose to stay for the
additional full credit.
Participants also competed the Iowa Gambling Task. This task was first developed to
assess impulsivity in people with damage to the prefrontal cortex (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio,
& Anderson, 1994), but has subsequently been used to assess self-control (Sharma, Markon, &
Clark, 2014). In this task, participants begin with a virtual loan of $2000. They are then able to
draw cards from one of four decks. Two of the decks are high-risk high-reward in that they have
a potential to pay out $100 but may also have a penalty fee of $250. Another two decks are low49

risk low-reward and will only pay $50 but has a possible penalty fee of only $50. The task is
calibrated such that, in the long run, it is far more advantageous to draw from the low-risk deck.
Drawing from exclusively the high-risk deck will result in a net loss and drawing from the lowrisk deck will result in a net gain. This task assesses impulsive behavior through people decisions
to draw from the high-risk deck or the low risk deck. Participants completed 100 trials and the
number of times they picked from the high-risk deck was counted. Higher scores indicate higher
impulsiveness. In the present study, the average number of times participants picked from the
high-risk deck was 31.35 (SD = 17.5, min = 0, max = 87).
Inhibition of Behavior
Three willpower tasks that have been used in past research were used in this study. These
were the taste test, the cold pressor, and the handgrip. The taste test was a measure of caloric
intake and has been used as a dependent measure of self-control in many studies of ego-depletion
(Hagger et al., 2010). This was performed identically to how it was described in Hagger et al.
(2013), since this is representative of the way this has been carried out in most ego-depletion
paradigms. For this task, participants were presented with a cover story about market researchers
being interested in college students’ perceptions of various foods. Participants were presented
with two different types of candies and asked to rank them on a variety of dimensions such as
taste, texture, and appearance. For the stimuli participants received with the taste test task, see
Appendix D. Participants were told that they may eat as much as they needed to in order to
accurately judge the quality of the candy. The two candies were Skittles™ and M&Ms™. 50
grams of each were weighed out and presented to the participant. When the participant signaled
that they were done evaluating the foods, the experimenter weighed the remaining candies and
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recorded the amount consumed in grams. In this sample, the average amount of candies
consumed was 11.04 grams (SD = 10.3, min = 0, max = 50).
The second persistence task was the cold pressor task. For this task, participants were told
that we would be testing their pain tolerance and were instructed to hold their hand in a bowl of
ice water for as long as they could. The water was maintained between 35 and 40 degrees
Fahrenheit. The cold pressor is frequently used in psychological studies to simulate pain
(Peckerman et al., 1998) and therefore measures a participant’s willingness to tolerate an
unpleasant stimulus. In theory, this task requires impulse inhibition because individuals must
inhibit the impulse to remove their hand from the ice water. To ensure participant safety, anyone
who passed the 3-minute mark was instructed to remove their hand from the water. The time (in
seconds) was recorded by the experimenter, with longer times indicating higher self-control. The
average amount of time that participants persisted on the cold pressor was 97.94 seconds (SD =
66.1, min = 3, max = 180).
This is identical to the protocol used by Schmeichel and Zell (2007), who did find that
persistence on the cold pressor was significantly related to self-reported self-control. The only
difference between the protocol used by Schmeichel and Zell (2007) and this protocol is that
they maintained the water at 34 degrees Fahrenheit, whereas I maintained the water between 35
degrees and 40 degrees Fahrenheit as advised by Mitchell et al. (2004). Of note, this decision
may have resulted in longer persistence times, since the average time reported by Schmeichel
and Zell (2004) was only 44 seconds.
The final task in this category was the handgrip task. This task has also been used in egodepletion paradigms (Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). On this task,
participants were given a handgrip and told squeeze it for as long as possible. To account for
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individual differences in maximum grip strength, participants first completed a baseline measure
of grip strength using a dynamometer. The handgrip was then calibrated to match their maximum
grip strength. Thus, this task should have been equally difficult for everyone regardless of their
maximum grip strength. Emulating prior research, a coin was placed between the two grips.
When the participant loosened their grip enough that the coin fell out, the experimenter stopped
the timer. The average amount of time that participants persisted on the handgrip was 17.98
seconds (SD = 15.77, min = 3, max = 87).
Initiation of Behavior
The impossible puzzle task was used to measure persistence in the face of failure. For this
task, participants were given an extremely difficult mathematics puzzle and told they had up to
30 minutes to work on it. However, if they found the puzzle too difficult, they could notify the
experimenter at any time to move on to the next portion of the study. The dependent variable was
the amount of time they persisted on the puzzle. Participants read the following prompt: “The
King of a small country invites 1000 senators to his annual party. As a tradition, each senator
brings the King a bottle of wine. Soon after, the Queen discovers that one of the senators is
trying to assassinate the King by giving him a bottle of poisoned wine. Unfortunately, they do
not know which senator, nor which bottle of wine, is poisoned, and the poison is completely
indiscernible. However, the King has 10 prisoners he plans to execute. He decides to use them as
taste testers to determine which bottle of wine contains the poison. The poison, when taken, has
no effect on the prisoner until exactly 24 hours later when the infected prisoner suddenly dies.
The King needs to determine which bottle of wine is poisoned by tomorrow so that the festivities
can continue as planned. Hence, he only has time for one round of testing. How can the King
administer the wine to the prisoners to ensure that 24 hours from now he is guaranteed to have
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found the poisoned wine bottle?” As evidence of the difficulty of this puzzle, only one
participant was able to solve it and it took them the entire 30 minutes. The average amount of
time spent on the puzzle was 12.22 minutes (SD = 6.98, min = 1.3, max = 30).
The second measure of behavioral initiation was the anagram task, which has often been
used in ego depletion paradigms. Emulating prior methodology, participants were presented with
a list of anagrams. Participants were told that each of the anagrams had at least three solutions
(e.g., agntleir can be rearranged as triangle, integral, or relating). However, this was false
information, and many of the anagrams only had one solution. Since both solvable anagrams
(Baumeister et al., 1998) and unsolvable anagrams (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006) have
been used as dependent measures of self-control, I decided to use a combination of both.
Persistence was assessed by the amount of time participants persisted at finding all of the
“solutions” before giving up. Participants were allowed a maximum of 30 minutes but were told
that they could notify the experimenter at any time if they would like to move on. The average
amount of time participants spent on the anagrams was 18.72 minutes (SD = 8.4, min = 2, max =
30).
The last task used to assess initiatory self-control was part of the taste test previously
mentioned. In addition to testing and rating candies, participants also rated several healthy but
commonly disliked foods. These included raw cauliflower and raw broccoli. Whereas inhibition
is required to resist eating tasty but unhealthy food, it theoretically requires initiatory self-control
to eat healthy but unpleasant foods. Therefore, whereas the sweet foods assess behavioral
inhibition, the healthy foods assess behavioral initiation. The experimenter placed 50 grams of
broccoli and 50 grams of cauliflower in front of the participants as part of the taste test task. The
vegetables were weighed afterwards, and the amount consumed was recorded in grams. The
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average amount of vegetables consumed was 9.7 grams (SD = 10.75, min = 0, max = 50). See
Table 4 for descriptive statistics for the behavioral measures used.
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics for Behavioral Measures
Measure Mean

SD

Min

Max

64.81 (ms)

-107.00 (ms)

298.00 (ms)

Flanker 25.97 (ms)

39.37 (ms)

-112.00 (ms)

130.00 (ms)

Cueing 71.23 (ms)

55.13 (ms)

-287.00 (ms)

291.00 (ms)

2.94

0

15

.03605

.00015

.24942

Handgrip 17.98 (s)

15.77 (s)

3 (s)

87 (s)

Cold Pressor 97.94 (s)

66.10 (s)

3 (s)

180 (s)

10.75 (g)

0 (g)

50 (g)

10.33 (g)

0 (g)

50 (g)

Iowa Gambling Task 31.35

17.50

0

87

Anagram Persistence 18.72 (m)

8.40 (m)

2 (m)

30 (m)

Math Persistence 12.23 (m)

6.98 (m)

1.6 (m)

30 (m)

Stroop 113.73 (ms)

Go/no go 3.71
Monetary Choice (k) .02319

Vegetables Consumed 9.74 (g)
Candies Consumed 11.04 (g)

Control Variables
Due to the fact that individuals come from diverse backgrounds, have diverse interests,
and are motivated to achieve different goals, it is important to account for this in an analysis of
self-control measures. For example, the food taste test task will have a different meaning for
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someone high in dietary restraint or with a weight loss goal as compared to someone who is
indifferent about how many calories they consume. Therefore, variables that may confound the
interpretation of self-control measures were measured and controlled for. The tasks that could
have potentially been confounded by participant motives included the delay of gratification task,
the food taste test, the impossible puzzle, and the adjusting amount procedure.
The delay of gratification task could be confounded by participant motives for extra
credit. Participants who are already doing well in their courses will have less of a need for extra
Sona credits and would thus be less motivated to stay. By contrast, students who are in dire need
of extra credit may be more likely to stay. To account for this, a single item was added that
assessed student’s perceptions of how well they are doing in their classes (e.g., how worried are
you that you won’t make the grade you want in your psychology classes?) This was ranked on a
5-point Likert scale. The average score on this item was 2.21 (SD = 1.2), indicating only
moderate worry about grades, on average.
The food taste test could have been confounded by participant’s specific motives
surrounding caloric intake and body weight. For someone with a goal of losing or maintaining
weight, resisting food is an excellent measure of self-control as it activates a conflict between
short-term goals (e.g., eat the tempting sweets) and long-term goals (e.g., losing weight). As
defined in this paper, self-control is any act that furthers long-term goals at the expense of shortterm goals. However, for someone without any calorie or weight related goals, indulging in the
candies does not constitute a failure of self-control. Therefore, it is important to be able to
differentiate between the participants with weight-related goals and those without. To this end,
the Weight Concerns Scale (Killen et al., 1994) was administered. This scale has shown
acceptable reliability in previous investigations (α = .77; see Dias, da Silva, Maroco, & Campos,
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2015) and showed good reliability in the current sample (α = .768). See appendix I for the full
Weight Concern Scale.
The impossible puzzle could be confounded by achievement motivation. Students high in
achievement motivation may tend to persist longer as compared to students low in achievement
motivation. Importantly, the impossible puzzle task may only constitute a measure of self-control
for those students high in achievement motivation. Absent achievement motivation, there would
be no conflict of short-term and long-term goals, as the motive to finish the puzzle would be nonexistent. To measure achievement motivation, the Achievement Motives Scale (Lang & Fries,
2006) was used. This scale contains two subscales which are the motive to achieve (α = .835)
and the motive to avoid failure (α = .807). See appendix J for the achievement motives scale.
Financial stress may confound the results of the adjusting amount procedure. Although
these are hypothetical choices, I find it likely that individuals experiencing significant financial
stress would be more likely to choose the smaller immediate rewards than the larger delayed
rewards. In order to account for this, the Financial Stress Questionnaire was used (MaumaryGremaud, 1997). This is a 9-item scale that assesses how much stress people experience as it
relates to having enough money for food, clothes, and leisure. This scale showed good reliability
(α = .921). See appendix K for the scale.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The primary goal of the present research was to determine whether self-control is more
appropriately conceptualized as a reflective construct or a formative construct. In order to do
this, the theoretical and empirical considerations noted by Coltman et al. (2008) were applied to
measures of self-control. These considerations included an examination of indicator
intercorrelations, examining indicator relationships with the theoretical antecedents and
consequences of the construct, and the vanishing tetrad test.
Data Cleaning and Normalization
Of note, there were several extreme scores present in the data. For example, although
90% of participants scored between 4.6 and 52.8 on the handgrip, a small number of participants
exceeded 80 seconds. Therefore, in order to normalize the data, all scores more than 3
interquartile ranges from the median were capped at 3 IQR above the median. Finally, to ensure
that all variables were scaled similarly and to avoid large discrepancies in covariances, all
variables were converted to Z-scores. The distributions for each variable, after the normalization
of outliers and conversion to Z-scores, are presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Pair Plots After Normalization
Indicator Intercorrelations
The first consideration outlined by Coltman et al. (2008) concerns indicator
intercorrelations. This is essentially a question of convergent validity. If all indicators were
influenced by a shared common cause, relatively high correlations would be expected between
indicators. Of course, due to measurement error and other unique sources of variance, it is
unlikely that any two indicators will correlate perfectly. On the other hand, due to the crud factor
(Meehl, 1990), it is also unlikely that any indicators will have no correlation with one another.
Unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules on what ranges of correlations would be expected
between indicators under a reflective model versus a formative model. To determine a reasonable
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range of values, I turned to the literature on intelligence -- a construct that is often considered to
be reflective. A review of the literature on g shows that correlations between different indicators
of intelligence range roughly from r = .50 to r = .80 (Canivez, Konold, Collins, & Wilson, 2009;
Borghese & Gronau, 2005; Erford & Pauletta, 2005; Spearman, 1904). Based on these
considerations, correlations between indicators of r < .40 were identified a priori to be
considered evidence against a reflective structure.
Table 5 shows intercorrelations between behavioral indicators of self-control. As can be
seen in the table, the correlations between the various measures are generally low or nonsignificant. However, there are a few significant correlations between indicators. The Stroop task
correlated significantly with the Iowa gambling task (r = .196, p = .007) such that higher
interference scores related to more risky draws on the Iowa gambling task. The flanker correlated
negatively with the go/no go (r = -.148, p = .041) such that a larger flanker effect related to fewer
errors of commission of the go/no go – a finding that is somewhat unexpected. The cueing task
correlated positively with risky draws on the Iowa gambling task (r = .173, p = .016) such that
greater interference on the cueing task predicted more risky draws on the Iowa gambling task.
Additionally, the cueing task correlated negatively with persistence on the math puzzle (r = .169, p = .020) such that greater interference on the cueing task predicted lower persistence on
the math puzzle. There was also a positive correlation between the Iowa gambling task and the
number of candies consumed during the taste test (r = .170, p = .019) such that a higher number
of risky draws on the Iowa gambling task predicted a greater consumption of candy. Persistence
on the math puzzle also correlated positively with the number of vegetables consumed during the
taste test (r = .197, p = .006) such that greater persistence on the math puzzle predicted eating
more vegetables. Persistence on the anagrams correlated positively with both persistence on the
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handgrip (r = .251, p < .001) and participants choice on the delay of gratification task (r = .188, p
= .009), such that participants who persisted longer on the anagrams were more likely to stay for
extra credits and hold the handgrip longer. Persistence on the cold pressor correlated positively
with both persistence on the handgrip (r = .220, p = .002) as well as the number of vegetables
consumed during the taste test (r = .245, p = .001). Finally, persistence on the handgrip predicted
participants choice on the delay of gratification task (r = .305, p < .001) such that participants
who held the handgrip longer were more likely to stay for additional credits. Controlling for
possible confounds (Table 6) had little effect on indicator intercorrelations, except that the
correlation between the Stroop and vegetables consumed (r = .145, p = .048) and the correlation
between go/no go errors and the delay task (r = -.144, p = .048) became significant.
Although there were some significant correlations between the different measures, none
of the observed correlations exceed the aforementioned r > .40 threshold. As such, it seems
unlikely that these measures are assessing the same construct. In fact, the magnitude of these
correlations hardly exceeds the “crud factor”, mentioned earlier (Meehl, 1990). Moreover, many
of the significant correlations were between measures with similar methods such as the two taste
test outcomes or persistence on the two puzzles. Correlations of this nature are likely not due to a
common underlying factor but instead method effects, which are defined as characteristics of a
measurement process that produces variance in scores beyond what is attributable to the
construct of interest (Maul, 2013). In this case, variance shared between the two taste tests is
likely not attributable to self-control, but rather other factors relevant to the consumption of food
such as appetite or weight concerns. One suggestion for future research, based on the presence of
probable method effects, is to closely examine the multitrait-multimethod matrix (Campbell &
Fiske, 1959) for evidence of method effects generating variance among measures of self-control.
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Indicator Relationships with Construct Consequences
The second analysis examined indicator relationships with the theoretical consequences
of self-control. As discussed earlier, if self-control is hypothesized to lead to a particular set of
outcomes, and a particular set of indicators are measuring self-control, then those indicators
should also be able to predict the outcomes associated with self-control. In order to do this,
correlations between the different measures of self-control and five life outcomes were
examined. The five outcomes were GPA, substance use, diet, exercise, and impulse shopping.
Since these life outcomes are theoretically more distant from self-control than the indicators
themselves and there is a large number of potential intervening variables between self-control
and life outcomes, lower correlations are expected than with the indicator intercorrelations. I
again turned to the literature on intelligence to determine an appropriate range of values for
indicator relationships with the theoretical consequences of a reflective construct. A review of
the literature shows that measures of full scale intelligence have correlations with life outcomes
such as school or work performance ranging roughly from r = .25 to r = .50 (Gygi, Hagmannvon Arx, Schweizer, & Grob, 2017; Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Bundy, 2001). However,
correlations between individual indicators of intelligence (e.g., measures of object assembly,
picture completion, geometric design, block design, arithmetic, and vocabulary) and life
outcomes such as academic performance range widely, generally falling between r = .15 and r =
.50 (Kaplan, 1996). Based on these considerations, if self-control is a reflective construct, I
expect indicators of self-control to correlate with the theoretically associated outcomes of self-
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Table 5.
Correlations Between Measures of Self-Control
Variable
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. Stroop

--

2. Flanker

.035

--

3. Cueing

.011

-.079

--

4. Go/no go

.062

-.148*

.090

--

5. Iowa

.196*

-.016

.173*

.073

--

6. Math Puzzle

-.005

.094

-.169*

.025

-.086

--

7. Anagram

-.112

.046

-.059

.023

-.021

.380*

--

8. Cold Pressor

-.047

-.043

-.016

-.049

-.025

.027

.142

--

9. Handgrip

-.150*

-.068

-.008

-.123

-.087

.099

.251*

.220*

--

10. Candies

-.056

.049

-.038

-.067

.170*

.066

-.034

.078

-.055

--

11. Vegetables

.096

.071

-.050

-.028

-.053

.197*

.121

.245*

.088

.268*

--

12. Discount k

.002

-.045

-.058

.040

-.015

.039

-.113

-.070

-.077

-.087

-.056

--

13. Delay of Grat.
*p < .05

-.090

.016

-.010

-.106

.013

-.029

.188*

-.017

.305*

-.065

.008

-.068

13

--

Note: Correlations are bivariate correlations not controlling for additional variables
Note: After applying Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, only 5 correlations remained significant (anagram and math puzzle, p = .00000006;
anagram and handgrip, p = .0003; vegetables consumed and cold pressor, p = .00063; delay task and handgrip, p = .00003; vegetables consumed and candies
consumed, p = .00013)

Table 6.
Correlations Between Measures of Self-Control – Controlling for Confounds
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. Stroop

--

2. Flanker

.033

--

3. Cueing

-.006

-.073

--

4. Go/no go

.045

-.156*

.004

--

5. Iowa

.176*

-.010

.162*

.047

--

6. Math Puzzle

-.015

.096

-.173*

.048

-.088

--

7. Anagram

-.077

.051

-.027

.074

.014

.386*

--

8. Cold Pressor

.007

-.005

-.006

-.058

-.012

.030

.108

--

9. Handgrip

-.160*

-.078

-.019

-.099

-.049

.100

.247*

.232*

--

10. Candies

-.034

.055

-.012

-.057

.201*

.069

-.069

.067

-.048

--

11. Vegetables

.145*

-.006

-.038

.200*

.094

.224*

.073

.268*

--

12. Discount k

.095

-.092

-.029

.076

-.018

.066

-.061

-.080

-.048

-.104

.022

--

13. Delay of Grat.
*p < .05

-.108

.007

-.008

-.144*

-.016

.221*

-.008

.300*

-.069

.022

-.068

.077

-.021

.007

13

--

Note: Correlations are partial correlations controlling for grade concerns, financial stress, weight concerns, and achievement motives
Note: After applying Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, only 3 correlations remained significant (anagram and math puzzle, p = .00000005; delay
task and handgrip, p = .00003; vegetables consumed and candies consumed, p = .0002)
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control with at least r = .20. I consider this a conservative estimate, because r = .20 would mean
that a particular indicator is only explaining 4% of the variance in a given outcome. Based on
these considerations, I set an a priori limit of r < .20 as evidence against a reflective model with
regard to indicator relationships with construct consequences.
Table 7 displays correlations between the various indicators and the outcomes
theoretically associated with self-control. Importantly, all correlations are presented after
controlling for the possible confounds noted above including weight concerns, need for
achievement, financial stress, and worry about grades. Overall, there was a severe lack of
significant correlations between the indicators of self-control and the hypothesized life outcomes
associated with self-control, after controlling for potential confounds. The cold pressor correlated
significantly with exercise (r = .260, p <.001). Somewhat unexpectedly, GPA correlated
positively with k (r = .209, p = .004), suggesting that individuals who are higher in delay
discounting have higher GPAs. Additionally, the consumption of healthy foods also correlated
negatively with the amount of candy consumed on the taste test (r = -.176, p = .017). Likewise,
self-reported consumption of unhealthy foods correlated negatively with the amount of
vegetables consumed during the taste test (r = -.147, p = .046).
Although there are a few significant correlations between these measures of self-control
and life outcomes, the inconsistency of the relationships, as well as the small magnitude of the
relationships, casts doubt on whether or not these are indeed assessing self-control. There are a
few possible conclusions based on this data. First, it is possible that self-control is still a
reflective construct, but that these are poor indicators of self-control and thus are unable to
provide useful information regarding outcomes associated with self-control. Second, it is
possible the self-control is better conceptualized as a formative construct and that certain
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indicators will only have predictive validity within certain domains. For example, perhaps the
cold pressor relates to a subdomain of self-control that is important for regulating exercise
behaviors, but not other types of behaviors. Both interpretations are explored further in the
discussion.
Table 7.
Correlations Between Indicators and Life Outcomes
Measure/Life GPA

AUDIT

Outcome

Impulse

Healthy

Unhealthy Exercise

shopping

Foods

Foods

Stroop .128

-.078

-.122

.079

-.019

-.049

Flanker -.021

-.120

-.015

.027

.038

-.075

Cueing -.002

-.099

-.049

.008

.060

.062

Go/no go .037

.079

.067

-.034

-.076

.002

Iowa .074

.021

.120

-.029

.039

.014

Math Puzzle .024

.060

.110

-.003

-.032

-.045

Anagram -.120

-.010

-.042

.095

-.106

-.015

Cold Pressor -.062

-.064

-.056

.074

-.091

.260*

Handgrip -.026

.076

-.114

.130

-.046

.076

Candies .006

.076

.080

-.176*

.010

.117

Vegetables -.063

-.027

-.008

.078

-.147*

.111

Discount k .209*

-.005

.087

.019

-.054

.104

Delay of Grat. -.062

-.067

-.121

-.005

-.008

-.166

*p < .05
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Note: Correlations presented are controlling for weight concerns, financial stress, achievement
motives, and worry about grades.
Indicator Relationships with Self-Report Measures
An additional test was to examine correlations between the various behavioral indicators
and self-report measures of self-control. In general, self-report measures of self-control have
been shown to be reliable as well as have good predictive validity (Tangney et al., 2004).
Therefore, if any of these behavioral tasks are good measures of self-control, they should be
related to self-reported self-control. Correlations between the various behavioral measures and
two commonly used self-report measures of self-control – the Self-Control Scale and the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale – are presented in Table 8. By and large, there were very few relationships
between the behavioral measures and self-reported self-control. The Self-Control scale correlated
weakly, but significantly, with the flanker task (r = .195, p = .007) as well as the amount of
candies consumed during the taste test (r = -.173, p = .017) and the amount of vegetables
consumed during the taste test (r = -.176, p = .015). In general, individuals scoring higher on the
Self-Control Scale consumed less food overall, regardless of type. Additionally, the amount of
candies consumed during the taste test was correlated positively with scores on the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (r = .164, p = .023), such that participants scoring higher on the BIS (more
impulsive) consumed more candies. Somewhat unexpectedly, persistence on the math puzzle
correlated positively with scores on the BIS (r = .156, p = .031), suggesting that higher
impulsiveness assessed by the BIS predicted decreased persistence. Overall, there was a severe
lack of correlations between behavioral measures and self-report measures, suggesting major
problems with the way that behavioral measures assess self-control.
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Table 8.
Correlations Between Behavioral Measures and Self-Report Measures
Measure Self-Control Scale

Barratt Impulsiveness

Stroop .008

-.028

Flanker .195*

-.132

Cueing .029

.047

Go/no go .033

-.027

Iowa .018

.041

Math Puzzle -.125

.156*

Anagram .046

-.087

Cold Pressor .060

-.142

Handgrip -.017

-.113

Candies -.173*

.164*

Vegetables -.176*

.052

Discount k -.043

.114

Delay of Grat. .024

-.096

*p < .05
Note: when using only the self-control subscale of the BIS, candies remained significant (r =
.163, p = .024), but math puzzle became nonsignificant (r = .130, p = .073). All other
relationships were nonsignificant.
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Vanishing Tetrad Test
The final proposed test to probe the structure of self-control was the vanishing tetrad test.
As noted previously, the vanishing tetrad test will not be applied to every possible tetrad of
indicators. This is because the number of sets of tetrads for models with n observed indicators is
n!/(n-4)!4! (Bollen & Ting, 2000). This means that for thirteen tests of self-control, there would
be 715 sets of tetrads, or 2145 implied vanishing tetrads. Therefore, I decided to first reduce the
number of indicators by obtaining factor scores corresponding to the four self-control subdomains outlined in the introduction. These sub-domains were attentional control, behavioral
inhibition, behavioral initiation, and attention to distal rewards.
In order to examine whether or not the various measures were likely to share variance
due to a common factor, I first conducted the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Test, which is a
measure of how suited the data are for factor analysis. A low value on this test (<.60) means that
there is a low proportion of shared variance among variables, making the data unsuitable for
dimension reduction techniques. By contrast, a high value (closer to 1) means that there is a large
proportion of shared variance that may be due to underlying factors (Kaiser, 1974). Not only
would a low KMO value suggest that dimension reduction techniques may be unsuitable but
would also render the idea of these indicators being part of a reflective construct untenable.
Using all thirteen indicators of self-control, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy yielded a value of .528. Kaiser (1974) classified values falling between .50 and .59 as
“miserable”, suggesting that these data are not suited well for factor analysis. Furthermore, the
fact that the KMO value falls in the miserable range is itself further evidence against these
indicators measuring a common construct. If these indicators did indeed share a common cause,
one would expect high KMO values due to a high amount of shared variance.
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As an additional test prior to obtaining factor scores, I conducted Bartlett’s test of
sphericity. This tests the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. An identity
matrix, or a correlation matrix in which the off-diagonals are exactly zero, would be further
evidence that these indicators do not share a common cause. Therefore, a non-significant
Bartlett’s test of sphericity could be considered further evidence against a reflective model.
Despite the relatively poor KMO value, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2(78) =
180.13, p < .001. However, further inspection of the correlation matrix shows that the significant
Bartlett’s test may be due primarily to method effects. As discussed previously, persistence on
the anagrams correlated with persistence on the math puzzle, since these are similar types of
tasks. Likewise, the amount of vegetables and the amount of candies consumed correlated
positively, since these are also similar types of tasks.
Next, I attempted to obtain factor scores for each sub-domain to be used in the vanishing
tetrad test. This step was performed using the Lavaan SEM package for R (Rosseel, 2012), which
can be used to define latent factors, obtain factor covariance matrices, and examine indicators of
model fit. The four hypothesized self-control subdomains were defined according to the theory
outlined in the introduction. Specifically, I defined four reflective factors, which included
cognitive inhibition (Stroop, flanker, go/no go, cueing), inhibiting behavior (cold pressor,
handgrip, candies), initiating behavior (math puzzle persistence, anagram persistence,
vegetables), and attention to distal rewards (Monetary Choice Questionnaire, delay of
gratification task, Iowa Gambling Task). Unfortunately, this model did not converge. The reason
for this seemed to be that the pattern of low and non-existent correlations between the various
indicators did not contain adequate information for the SEM package to be able to generate
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meaningful factors. In other words, the relationships between the indicators were too small for
the SEM package to be able to estimate the hypothesized latent factors.
To rule out possible issues with the data being the cause for the lack of model
convergence, the data was further normalized. Two indicators, the cold pressor and the anagram
task, showed strong ceiling effects in that on both tasks many participants persisted for the full
amount of time. In addition, the taste test indicators, the delay discounting (k) indicator, the
go/no go, and the handgrip were positively skewed. Therefore, these variables were log
transformed to reduce skew and the analysis was rerun. The distribution of the data following the
removal of outliers and log transformations can be found in Figure 4. Notably, because log
transformations are nonlinear, many of the indicator intercorrelations in the log transformed data
are reduced. Ultimately, further normalization of the data still did not allow model convergence
and the estimation of the hypothesized latent factors.
Due to these issues with model convergence, I decided to simplify the model and include
only the two primary sub-domains of self-control identified by de Ridder et al. (2011). These two
primary subdomains were initiatory self-control and inhibitory self-control. Two new models
were specified, again using the Lavaan SEM package for R. The first model consisted of only
indicators that assess the inhibition of behaviors. This included the Stroop, cueing, go/no go,
flanker, candy portion of the taste test, and the cold pressor. As outlined in the introduction, all
of these behaviors tasks theoretically require the participants to override a dominant response or
ignore task-irrelevant information.
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Figure 4. Pair Plots After Log Transformation
This model did converge and showed acceptable fit statistics, χ2(9) = 3.3, p = .951, CFI =
1.0, RMSEA = 0.000, SRMR = .028. Despite good indices of model fit, however, none of the
indicators significantly loaded on the inhibition latent factor. Table 9 shows indicator factor
loadings on the inhibitory factor. This further suggests that there is a very small amount of
shared variance among these indictors, which would be inconsistent with a reflective model of
self-control.
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Table 9.
Indicator Loadings on Inhibitory Factor
Indicator Loading on Inhibitory Factor

Std. Error

GNG .489

.246

Stroop .089

.129

Cueing -.282

.161

Flanker .208

.140

Candies Consumed -.161

.134

Cold Pressor -.072

.128

Finally, a vanishing tetrad test was performed on the six indicators in the inhibitory
model using the R package “ConfirmatoryTetradAnalysis” (Hangcheng, 2019). This yielded a
non-significant test statistic, t = 2.43, p = .983. In other words, the tetrad differences were not
significantly different from zero. Although a nonsignificant test statistic would ordinarily be
suggestive a reflective model, in this particular case there is another interpretation of this result.
Recall that the vanishing tetrad test looks for differences between the products of pairs of
covariances, where significant differences indicate data consistent with a formative model. The
equations for any given set of four variables are:
Tabcd = σabσcd - σacσbd
Tacdb = σacσdb - σadσcb
Tadbc = σadσbc - σabσdc
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where σ is equal to the population covariance of the two variables that are indexed below it.
Vanishing tetrads, implied by reflective models, mean that Tabcd = 0. By contrast, tetrads not
equal to zero would imply that each set of covariances have unique sources of variance and
would thus be most consistent with a formative model.
However, in this case, inspection of the covariance matrix shows several near-zero
covariances. This means that for each equation calculating the differences between pairs of
covariances, there are values being multiplied by zero. Since anything multiplied by zero is just
zero, this will give the appearance that the tetrads vanish, when in fact this is just an illusion
created from the exceedingly low covariances between indicators. In other words, the indicators
relate to one another so poorly that the vanishing tetrad test is unable to provide reliable results.
Table 10 shows the covariance matrix for the five inhibitory indicators submitted to the tetrad
test. It can be seen that the covariances are all very nearly zero, thus explaining the nonsignificant result from the tetrad test.
Table 10.
Covariances for Inhibitory Indicators Submitted to the Tetrad Test
Variable

1

2

3

4

1. GNG

--

2. Stroop

.034

--

3. Flanker

-.143

-.023

--

4. Cueing

.099

.016

-.067

--

5. Sweets

.071

-.011

.048

-.033

--

6. Cold Pressor

-.035

-.006

.020

-.015

.012
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5

6

--

The second model consisted of only indicators that assess the initiation of behaviors, or
tasks that require some active engagement on the part of the participant to complete. This model
included the handgrip, persistence on the math puzzle, persistence on the anagrams, their choice
of whether or not to complete extra work on the delay of gratification task, and the vegetable
portion of the taste test. It should be noted that earlier, the handgrip had been classified as
inhibitory self-control. This was a decision that had been based on previous discussion of the
handgrip where it was framed as inhibiting an impulse (e.g., “Stamina counts as a measure of
self-control because it involves resisting fatigue and overriding the urge to quit;” Baumeister et
al., 2007, p. 352). However, conceptual reflection led to the conclusion that squeezing a handgrip
is much more an act of initiating a behavior rather than inhibiting a behavior, so it was included
in the behavioral initiation model.
This model had relatively poor fit statistics, χ2(5) = 20.65, p = .001, CFI = .757, RMSEA
= 0.128, SRMR = .075. Both persistence on the math puzzle and persistence on the anagrams
had loadings above .40 on the initiatory factor (.459 and .775, respectively). However, this is
somewhat expected given that both of these are measures of persistence and are correlated with
one another. Table 11 shows indicator factor loadings for the behavioral initiation factor.
The five variables in the behavioral initiation factor were then submitted to the vanishing
tetrad test. This resulted in a non-significant test statistic, t = 1.93, p = .859. Like before, it
should be noted that the non-significant vanishing tetrad test would ordinarily indicate support
for a reflective model. However, inspection of the covariance matrix again shows many nearzero values, suggesting that the results of the vanishing tetrad test may be misleading. Table 12
shows the covariance matrix for the indicators in the behavioral initiation model.
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Table 11.
Indicator Factor Loadings on Behavioral Initiation Factor
Indicator Loading on Initiatory Factor

Std. Error

Handgrip .347

.088

Math Puzzle .459

.093

Anagram .775

.122

Vegetables .193

.088

Delay of Grat. .250

.088

Table 12.
Covariances for Initiatory Indicators Submitted to the Tetrad Test
Variable

1

2

3

4

2. Handgrip

--

3. Math Puzzle

.160

--

4. Anagrams

.269

.355

--

5. Vegetables

.067

.089

.150

--

6. Delay of Grat.

.087

.115

.194

.049
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5

--

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
General Discussion
The goal of the current research was to apply theoretical and empirical considerations to
indicators of self-control in order to determine whether indicators of self-control behave more
like indicators of a reflective construct or a formative construct. Theoretical considerations
included whether or not the construct is thought to exist independently of the measures used,
whether causality is theorized to flow from the construct to the indicators, and whether the
construct is manifested by the items. Empirical considerations included examining indicator
intercorrelations, examining indicator relationships with theoretical antecedents and
consequences of the construct, and the vanishing tetrad test (Coltman et al., 2008; Bollen &
Ting, 2000).
With respect to the theoretical considerations, I considered whether self-control is
expected to be causally influential on processes such as cognitive inhibition, behavioral
inhibition, behavioral initiation, and delay of gratification or whether these tasks together
constitute self-control. To be sure, both sides of this debate can be argued. In the introduction, I
argued that these subprocesses could operate independently of one another, and that being
sufficiently skilled in these domains is what constitutes high self-control. This view would be
most consistent with a formative model. On the other hand, a large body of theorizing has
conceptualized self-control as a single construct acting causally on these domains (Baumeister et
al., 2007; Tangney et al., 2004). That is, self-control has been described as a construct that exists
independently of the measures used, explains variance in a wide variety of indicators, and for
which the indicators are interchangeable. Arguably, a reflective model is the dominant
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conceptualization of self-control as evidenced by numerous research programs that use diverse
indicators interchangeably and interpret the results indiscriminately as levels of self-control
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010; Vohs et al., 2014).
However, despite some theoretical considerations suggesting that self-control is a
reflective construct, in the present study the indicators of self-control failed all of the empirical
tests for being indicators of a reflective construct. This largely replicated previous research
(Duckworth & Kern, 2010; Lane et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2006; Saunders et al., 2017;
Schmeichel & Zell, 2007; White et al., 1994) suggesting that indicator intercorrelations are low
and that indicators have little-to-no relationship with the theoretical consequences of the
construct (Fine et al., 2016; Lane et al., 2003; Sharma et al., 2014; Ward et al., 1993; White et al.
1994). Assuming for the moment that the various cognitive and behavioral tests used in selfcontrol research are indeed measuring important components of self-control (e.g., cognitive
inhibition, behavioral inhibition, behavioral initiation), the consistent pattern of low and
nonsignificant correlations between them makes the notion of a reflective construct untenable.
With regard to the current research, I observed a consistent pattern of low indicator
intercorrelations ranging from r = -.169 up to r = .380. Moreover, two of the largest correlations
(r = .268 between the amount vegetables consumed and the amount of candies consumed; r
= .380 between persistence on the math puzzle and persistence on the anagrams) are almost
certainly due to method effects rather than shared variance due to a common underlying
construct. That is, these tasks were so similar in type that any correlation between them is likely
due to the similarity of the tasks rather than variance shared due to an underlying latent
construct.
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Despite the generally low and non-significant correlations among the various measures, it
should be noted that there were a few significant correlations that were not likely due to method
effects. The two indicators that had the most consistent pattern of relationships with other
measures were the number of impulsive draws on the Iowa Gambling Task and the handgrip
task, with the Iowa Gambling Task correlating significantly with three other measures and
handgrip persistence correlating significantly with four other measures. The number of impulsive
draws on the Iowa Gambling Task correlated significantly with Stroop interference (r = .196, p
= .007), cueing interference (r = .173, p = .016), and the number of candies consumed during the
taste test (r = .170, p = .019). The amount of time that participants were able to persist at holding
the handgrip correlated significantly with persistence on the anagrams (r = .251, p < .001),
participants choice on the delay of gratification task (r = .305, p < .001), persistence on the cold
pressor (r = .220, p = .002), and correlated negatively with Stroop interference scores (r = -.150,
p = .038). Other significant correlations of interest include the correlation between persistence on
the anagrams and participants choice on the delay of gratification task (r = .188, p = .009),
persistence on the cold pressor and the number of vegetables consumed during the taste test (r =
.245, p = .001), persistence on the math puzzle and vegetables consumed during the taste test (r
= .197, p = .006), persistence on the math puzzle and cueing interference (r = -.169, p = .020),
and a negative correlation between flanker scores and errors of commission on the go/no go (r =
-.148, p = .041).
One interpretation of this pattern of significant correlations is that these measures share
variance due to an underlying construct. Unlike the correlations between the two persistence
tasks and the two taste test indicators, the correlations just mentioned are likely not due to
method effects since these correlations are between measures of quite different types (e.g.,
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heteromethod-monotrait; Campbell &Fiske, 1959). Indeed, the nature of these tasks vary widely
from tests of reaction time and cognitive inhibition to persistence on puzzles to food
consumption to physical endurance and pain tolerance. Further support for these measures
sharing at least some variance due to a common latent factor is that all of the noted correlations
are in the direction that would be expected based on theory, with the one exception being the
negative correlation between the flanker and errors of commission on the go/no go. One
possibility based on these findings is that these measures are indeed capturing variance
associated with self-control, but that these are also very noisy measures with large sources of
error variance resulting in low correlations between indicators. In fact, it is difficult to come up
with an additional plausible explanation, besides a latent factor, that explains the shared variance
between tasks as diverse as a gambling task, a taste test, handgrip persistence, a delay of
gratification task, and tests of reaction time. Methodologically speaking, these tasks have little to
do with one another. However, assuming for the moment that these measures are correlated due
to a latent factor (e.g., self-control), the low magnitude of the correlations suggests that, at best,
these are noisy measures with significant sources of error variance.
Therefore, based on these results it could be the case that these measures are assessing
variance associated with self-control, albeit a very small amount. The majority of variance in
individual’s scores would be attributable to the unique demands of each task, rather than the
latent construct they are intended to measure. For example, consider the correlation between
math puzzle persistence and vegetables consumed. The correlation between these two variables
was r = .197, or an r-squared = .039. In other words, persistence on the math puzzle and the
amount of vegetable consumed share about 3.9% of their variance. Since these two tasks share
very little in common methodologically, it is not unreasonable to assume that the shared variance
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is not due to any method effects but is rather due to a shared latent construct. The rest of the
variance that is not shared (e.g., 96.1%) would be variance that is unique to each task. For
example, on the math puzzle, factors like need for cognition, the motive to achieve, enjoyment of
math puzzles, or expertise in mathematics could be sources of variance that are unique to that
task and are unrelated to the amount of vegetables consumed. Likewise, there are unique sources
of variance in the vegetable taste test (e.g., appetite, weight concerns, taste preferences) that
influence individual’s scores and are not present in the math puzzle. In simpler terms, it might be
that self-control accounts for a very small amount of the shared variance (about 3.9%) between
these tasks, but idiosyncrasies in task demands (e.g., attention, appetite, pain tolerance, need for
cognition, etc.) dominate the data and represent large sources of error variance. In this sense,
these measures may in some small part assess self-control, but overall are far too noisy to yield
meaningful relationships.
Despite the presence of some interesting indicator intercorrelations, the current research
showed a pattern of low and nonsignificant correlations between the indicators of self-control
and the theoretical consequences of self-control. As mentioned, self-control has been theorized to
have a wide-reaching influence on diverse behaviors and outcomes including achievement,
interpersonal success, adjustment, dietary restraint, substance use, and spending (Baumeister,
2002; Baumeister et al., 2007; Tangney et al., 2004). Therefore, assuming again for the moment
that self-control is a reflective construct and that the various cognitive and behavioral tasks are
valid measures of self-control, such measures would be expected to predict these life outcomes.
By and large, this is not what was observed. Correlations between the indicators and life
outcomes ranged from r = -.176 to r = .260, with only four significant correlations in total.
Moreover, like with the indicator intercorrelations, two of these significant correlations (r = -.147
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between vegetables consumed on the taste tests and self-reported consumption of healthy foods;
r = -.176 between candies consumed on the taste test and self-reported consumption of healthy
foods), are likely not due to the effects of a latent construct but due to the simple fact that the
behavioral tests are assessing the same behavior about which the self-report measures are asking
(e.g., both measure food consumption).
Like the indicator intercorrelations, the lack of relationships could be largely due to the
fact that these appear to be noisy measures with large sources of error variance (e.g., variance
that cannot be accounted for by their relationship with the latent construct). Even when using
good measures of a construct, indicator correlations with the construct consequences would not
necessarily be expected to be exceptionally high. This is because there are even more sources of
potential variance. First, there is the variance associated with task idiosyncrasies, as discussed
previously. Second, there is variance associated with the measurement of the outcome variable
(e.g., health behaviors, impulse shopping, etc.). Finally, on the path from self-control to the
proposed outcomes, there are additional factors at play that operate independently of self-control
but also influence the outcome variable. For example, although self-control is proposed to
influence student’s GPA, there is a host of other variables, independent of self-control, that
determine GPA, such as financial resources, the presence or absence of an illness, peer group,
instructor quality, and many more. Put simply, even if you could measure self-control perfectly,
this would not allow you to estimate theoretically implied outcomes with perfect accuracy. This
fact, paired with the already noisy measurement methods, may be what explains the pattern of
extremely low indicator correlations with the construct consequences. Self-control may play an
important role in behaviors such as impulse shopping, substance use, and academic behaviors,
but if self-control cannot be measured without large error variance and the consequences of the
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construct are theoretically distant to begin with (e.g., outcomes that are manifested after the
influence of a large number of intervening variables), correlations between the construct and it’s
theoretically implied consequences cannot possibly be expected to be high.
Next, I had planned to generate factor scores based on the four hypothesized subdomains
of self-control (controlling attention, behavioral inhibition, behavioral initiation, attention to
distal rewards) and submit these to the vanishing tetrad test as a way of testing the final empirical
consideration of whether a construct is reflective or formative. I was, however, unable to do this
because the hypothesized four factor model did not converge, suggesting that the four-factor
model had extremely poor fit to the data. Examination of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of
Sampling Adequacy showed a value of .528, which Kaiser (1974) labeled as “miserable.” This
means that it is unlikely that there are patterns in the data that would be amenable to factor
analysis.
I then examined a two-factor model including factors for inhibitory self-control and
initiatory self-control, the two main types of self-control identified by de Ridder et al. (2011).
The inhibitory factor was comprised of tasks that involve inhibiting an automatic response and
included the Stroop, the Go/no-go, the cueing, the flanker, the candy portion of the taste test, and
the cold pressor. Although this model had good fit statistics, none of the indicators loaded
significantly on the inhibition factor, suggesting that these tasks have little to do with one
another. This, in-and-of-itself, could be considered further evidence against a formative model.
Next, I conducted the vanishing tetrad test on these six indicators and found a nonsignificant
result. Although ordinarily a nonsignificant result on this test would favor a reflective
interpretation, the pattern of near-zero covariances between indicators likely resulted in a false
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negative. In other words, the covariance matrix contained so little information so as to render the
vanishing tetrad test unreliable.
The initiatory factor was comprised of tasks that involve the initiation of behavior in
order to complete a task. These indicators included the amount of vegetables consumed,
persistence on the handgrip, persistence on the math puzzle, persistence on the anagrams, and the
participant’s choice of whether or not to stay in the study longer to earn additional credit. This
model had relatively poorer fit indices, but persistence on the math puzzle and persistence on the
anagrams did load significantly on the initiatory factor. Finally, I conducted the vanishing tetrad
test on these five indicators and found a nonsignificant result. Like the tetrad test on the
inhibitory indicators, however, it is likely that the covariance matrix contained so little
information that it rendered the vanishing tetrad test unreliable.
Overall, the data do not support a reflective model of self-control. Although theory may
suggest that self-control is reflective, the indicators for self-control fail all of the empirical tests
that would suggest it is reflective. If self-control were a reflective construct, indicators of selfcontrol would be expected to be interchangeable and highly correlated due to sharing a common
cause. The fact that the data show a pattern of largely small and non-significant correlations
between indictors suggests that it is highly unlikely that they are all measuring the same
underlying construct.
There are three main interpretations of the data at this point. First, self-control could be
reconceptualized as a formative construct. This would remove the assumption that indicators
should be correlated, which is consistent with the data. It would also remove the assumption that
all indicators should relate similarly to the consequences of the construct, since subdomains of
self-control could operate independently of one another, with some being relevant for certain
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behaviors and not others. For example, perhaps the cold pressor assesses a sub-domain of selfcontrol that is relevant for explaining exercise behavior, but not shopping behavior.
The second interpretation is that self-control is a reflective construct, but that these
measures are far too noisy and contain too large sources of additional variance making them
unreliable measures of self-control. As discussed earlier, this may be suggested by a pattern of
significant (albeit small) correlations between indicators. Moreover, all of these correlations
were in the direction expected by theory (with the exception of one) and were between
methodologically diverse measures. The fact that many of these correlations were between
methodologically dissimilar indicators effectively rules out method effects as a plausible
explanation for at least some of these correlations. However, one could counter the interpretation
that these correlations are due to shared variance in the self-control construct and propose that
they are instead due to shared variance in another construct that influences performance on these
tasks, such as general intelligence. Theorists may want to consider this as an alternative possible
explanation for the pattern of relationships among these indicators.
The third interpretation is that, regardless of whether self-control is reflective or
formative construct, these measures are bad indicators of self-control. Under this interpretation,
none of these measures are assessing any construct level variance, and any significant
correlations are merely false positives or due to method effects. As such, one would not expect
any of these indicators to tell us anything about the structure of the self-control construct. Under
this interpretation, asking questions about the structure of self-control using these indicators may
be akin to asking questions about the structure of socioeconomic status (SES) by using data on
hair color and eye color. The latter is unrelated to the former and cannot answer any questions
about the nature of the construct.
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Unfortunately, the available data cannot definitively say which interpretation is correct. It
can, however, provide some guidance. Let’s assume for a moment that the first interpretation is
correct and that self-control is best conceptualized as a formative construct. Even though we
would not necessarily expect indicator intercorrelations to be high, we would still expect
indicator correlations with global measures of the construct, such as self-report measures. Again,
taking up the SES analogy from before, although one might not necessarily expect individual
indicators to correlate with one another, one would expect indicators to correlate (at least
somewhat) with overall measures of SES, since they are by definition part of what comprises this
construct. Therefore, if self-control were a formative construct, one would expect individual
indicators of self-control to correlate at least weakly with global self-control, since they are part
of how the construct is defined. This is not what was observed. Indicator correlations with
established self-report measures ranged from r = -.176 (SCS and vegetables consumed) to r
= .195 (SCS and flanker score). These correlations were, on the whole, small and nonsignificant.
The fact that the indicators do not relate to global self-control is evidence that, regardless
of whether self-control is reflective or formative, these are poor indicators of self-control.
Unfortunately, if this is the case, then the available data is not in a position to answer the
question of whether or not self-control is reflective or formative. Until behavioral measures are
developed that relate significantly to global measures of self-control, this question probably
cannot be answered. As Cronbach and Meehl stated in 1955 (p. 287), “if the obtained correlation
departs from the expectation, however, there is no way to know whether the fault lies in test A,
test B, or the formulation of the construct.” Initially, I had hypothesized that the problem was
with the formulation of the construct. However, based on an examination of the data and taking
into account the startling lack of convergent, predictive, and concurrent validity of these
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measures, I now find it likely that the problem lies in the tests. Furthermore, questions about the
formulation of the construct will likely be unanswerable until the development of behavioral
tests that relate to global self-control in a meaningful way.
Limitations
There are a few potential limitations of the current research. The first limitation concerns
ecological validity. It is possible that many of the laboratory test of self-control used in the
present research do not resemble real-life acts of self-control and thus do not assess the construct
accurately. For example, on the adjusting amount task, hypothetical rewards were used instead of
real rewards. This could be relevant because research suggests that participants tend to respond
to risk differently on hypothetical tasks as opposed to real tasks, with participants being more
risk-sensitive on real tasks (Xu, Fang, & Rao, 2013). Similarly, on tasks like the food taste test,
the environment and context of a laboratory does not match that of naturalistic food related
temptations, which more often occur in restaurants or grocery stores. For tasks like the cold
pressor, participants may not have seen a good reason to be sufficiently motivated to endure the
pain of holding their hand in ice water. Usually, when people force themselves to endure pain, it
is in the service of a long-term goal, such as becoming stronger or more athletic, which was not
the case in the present study. Although the low ecological validity of the laboratory setting may
have had an effect on the accuracy of participant’s scores, this is not a problem unique to this
study. Ideal conditions or not, self-control researchers are going to have to conduct tests in the
laboratory at some point, and it is important to assess the accuracy of these measures in this
context.
Another concern was that performance may be inconsistent across tests due to egodepletion effects (Baumeister et al., 1998). The ego-depletion effect refers to a phenomenon
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wherein an initial act of self-control can “deplete” self-control resources, leading to poorer
performance on subsequent tasks requiring self-control. Although the effect is somewhat
controversial (Carter et al., 2015), this was a concern in the present study due to the sheer
quantity of self-control measures being administered. If the ego-depletion effect is a real
phenomenon, then one would have expected to see substantial depletion effects by the end of this
study. Moreover, there is some evidence that ego-depletion effects may become more severe
after repeated engagement with depleting tasks (Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012). To
protect against this, the order of the behavioral measures of self-control was randomized. The
randomization of the order of the tasks should have prevented ego-depletion effects from
corrupting the data. However, due to the nature of the delay of gratification task (offering
research credits for extra time in the study), it had to be the last measure administered. Therefore,
if depletion effects were present, they may have influenced participants’ decisions on this last
task.
Another limitation unique to the delay of gratification task could have been that the time
of semester that participants completed the study influenced participants’ decisions. Early on in
the semester, students have not yet earned any Sona credits and my thus be willing to stay and
earn additional credits. As the semester progresses, students begin to meet the Sona requirements
for their courses and will thus be less likely to desire additional Sona credits. Thus, students
participating in the study toward the end of the semester may have been less likely to select the
option for extra credits simply because they already had enough credits. On the other hand, it
could be argued that students participating toward the end of the semester who had not yet
fulfilled Sona requirements would be more desperate for Sona credits and would thus be more
likely to stay for the extra credits. In any case, the time of semester is a potential confound with
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regard to participants choice to stay for additional credits. In order to account for this, data
collection was ceased two weeks prior to the end of the semester, although some of the effects of
this may still have been present.
A final limitation of the data is that a few of the tests, in particular the cold pressor task
and the anagram task, showed ceiling effects. On the anagram task, 20.9% of participants
persisted for the entire thirty minutes. On the cold pressor task, 35.6% of participants persisted
for the maximum of 180 seconds. These ceiling effects on these variables severely limits their
variability and the inferences that can be drawn from them. Unfortunately, this is not an issue
that can be addressed post-hoc, and it should be noted that the ceiling effects on these variables
may limit the inferences drawn from them.
Implications for Future Research
The results of this research generate at least one clear direction for future research. First
and foremost, this research shows that the research community does not currently have any
validated “gold standard” behavioral measures of self-control. Therefore, at a bare minimum,
researchers should seek to develop behavioral tests of self-control that display reliable
relationships with validated self-report measures of global self-control. As noted earlier, this is a
necessary precondition to being able to ask questions about the ontological nature of the
construct. Regardless of whether self-control is reflective or formative, indicators should be able
to correlate, at least somewhat, with global self-control.
Additionally, when developing future measures, researchers should pay special attention
to the multitrait-multimethod matrix described by Campbell and Fiske (1959) to ensure that the
construct indicators are behaving in a way consistent with theory. The multitrait-multimethod
matrix is a method for establishing construct validity, which examines both convergent and
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divergent validity in determining whether a supposed measure of a construct relates the way that
it theoretically should to other measures. A proposed measure of a construct should correlate
highly with measures of theoretically related constructs and bear less relationship with measures
of theoretically distinct constructs. Based on the available data, currently used measures of selfcontrol do not behave the way that measures of self-control would be theoretically expected to
behave.
Additionally, examination of the multitrait-multimethod matrix allows for the assessment
of method effects, which may be present among measures of self-control. This is because in
examining the multitrait-multimethod matrix, it is expected that correlations between measures
of the same trait using different methods (e.g., heteromethod-monotrait) should be higher than
correlations between measures of different traits using the same method (e.g., monomethodheterotrait) (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). If the latter is equal to or higher than the former, this
suggests that characteristics of the methodology, rather than the construct, are explaining
variance. In other words, traits should be empirically distinguishable even when assessed via the
same method.
An example of what this might look like is shown in Table 13. To arrange a multitraitmultimethod matrix, two measures of the same trait using different methods are needed, as well
as two measures of a different trait using the same two methods. In the example below, two traits
(self-control and working memory) are being measured with two different methods (self-report
and measures of cognitive performance). Characteristics of this matrix to which researchers
should pay attention are convergent validity (e.g., tests of the same construct should correlate
highly), discriminant validity (e.g., measures of one construct should not correlate highly with
measures of a different construct), and considerations of multitrait-multimethod variance that
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allow for the assessment of method specific variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). As stated
previously, correlations between measures of the same trait using different methods (e.g.,
heteromethod-monotrait) should be higher than correlations between measures of different traits
using the same method (e.g., monomethod-heterotrait). If, in this example, the correlation
between the N-back and the Stroop (monomethod-heterotrait) were found to be higher than the
correlation between the Stroop and the Self-Control Scale (heteromethod-monotrait), this could
be evidence for strong method effects present in the Stroop task.
Table 13.
Example Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix for an Indicator of Self-Control
Test

Self-Control Scale

Behavioral Measure

Working Memory

Being Validated

Questionnaire

N-back Task

(example: Stroop)
Self-Control Scale

--

Behavioral Measure

Heteromethod-

Being Validated

Monotrait (highest

(example: Stroop)

expected)

Working Memory

Monomethod-

Heteromethod-

Questionnaire

Heterotrait (low,

Heterotrait (lowest

less than monotrait)

of all expected)

Heteromethod-

Monomethod-

Heteromethod-

Heterotrait (lowest

Heterotrait (low,

Monotrait (highest

of all expected)

less than monotrait)

expected)

N-back Task

--

--

--

Second, I would strongly suggest that researchers consider taking into account
individuals’ specific goal conflicts when measuring self-control behaviorally. The temptation to
eat a slice of chocolate cake is not equally strong across all individuals, nor is the desire to lose
weight equally strong across all individuals. The handgrip task might have a different meaning
90

for a male who is trying to impress a female experimenter than for a female working with a
female experimenter. The impossible puzzle task might have a different meaning for someone
who bases their self-concept around their intelligence and ingenuity than someone who bases
their self-concept on their appearance or physical ability. The point is that goal conflicts are
different for different people, and it is unlikely that any one task will adequately assess selfcontrol in all individuals.
When devising new tests of self-control, it will be of crucial importance to keep in mind
what self-control fundamentally is. As defined in this paper and by Fujita et al. (2011), selfcontrol is “the process of advancing distal rather than proximal motivations when the two
compete” (p. 352). Therefore, what any good measure of self-control should be assessing is an
individual’s ability to pursue distal motivations, particularly in situations where more proximal
temptations are competing with these. This aspect of motivation and goal-pursuit is something
that is sorely lacking from current behavioral measures of self-control. For instance, rewards do
not increase the longer an individual persists on the cold pressor or an impossible puzzle. In a
best-case scenario, currently available methods could be modified to induce goal conflicts and
assess the ways in which individuals resolve such conflicts. For example, imagine offering
participants $10 if they were able to solve the impossible puzzle. What one would likely find is
that suddenly, a lot more participants would have the “self-control” to persist the entire time.
Taking all of this into consideration, it may be that the best way to assess self-control
behaviorally is to track people’s behavior on a day-to-day basis using an experience sampling
methodology (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). By doing this, researchers would be better equipped
to understand the goals of participants, the types of goal conflicts they encounter, and the ways in
which they resolve such goal conflicts. This would have several advantages over laboratory tests
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of self-control, such as increased ecological validity, the ability to account for individual
differences in goal conflicts, and would allow for the analysis of variables not present in
laboratory settings that may influence behavioral outcomes.
Ultimately, the currently available measures of self-control do not appear to be assessing
important aspects of the construct. This is evidenced by the poor convergent, predictive, and
concurrent validity found in this study as well as numerous others. In order for self-control
research to get back on its feet, researchers will need to develop behavioral measures of selfcontrol that, at a minimum, can relate reliably to measures of global self-control. Until this first
goal is accomplished, questions regarding the antecedents and consequences of state self-control
and phenomena such as ego-depletion will have to go unanswered.
Conclusion
In sum, the data show a pattern of relatively low and nonsignificant correlations between
the indicators of self-control. One possible interpretation of this finding is that self-control is a
formative construct comprised of many unrelated subdomains that are all relevant for goalrelated behaviors. In such a circumstance, high indicator intercorrelations would not necessarily
be expected. However, based on a pattern of (albeit small) significant indicator intercorrelations,
I find one of two additional interpretations to be more likely.
First, it could be that self-control is a reflective construct and, simply put, none of these
measures are capturing any of the variance associated with the construct. In other words, these
are bad measures of self-control and any observed correlations are due merely to method effects
(Maul, 2013). In fact, the presence of at least two correlations (correlations between the two taste
tests and correlations between the two puzzle persistence measures) are almost certainly due to
method effects rather than a shared variance due to a latent construct.
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A second and more optimistic interpretation is that self-control is a reflective construct
and that some of these measures are in fact assessing variance shared due to this construct, as
evidenced by a pattern of small but significant correlations between several indicators.
Moreover, these relationships were (with the exception of one) in the direction that would be
expected based on theory. That being said, the correlations between these indicators are small
and the variance in these measures is most likely dominated by sources of variance that are
unique to each task, rather than due to the construct they are intended to measure. This severely
limits the inferences about self-control that can be drawn from these measures. At the present
moment, it seems that measures of self-control are far too noisy in the sense that responses are
dominated by error variance and method effects due to task idiosyncrasies. For example,
although a small percentage of the variance in taste test outcomes may be attributable to selfcontrol, such outcomes are ultimately better assessments of factors like taste preference or
appetite, and thus such outcomes only provide minimal information on self-control. Thus,
moving forward with self-control research, it is suggested that researchers first develop
behavioral measures of self-control that are able to minimize the amount of variance due to task
idiosyncrasies and method effects, while maximizing the amount of variance captured in the selfcontrol construct.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Demographic Questionnaire
Age: ____
Gender:
__Female
__Male
__Transgender
Other:____
What is your racial/ethnic identity?
__White/Caucasian
__Black, African-American, or African
__Hispanic or Latino/a
__Middle Eastern
__East Asian or South Asian
__Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
__Native American or American Indian
__Caribbean
Other: _____
What is your sexual orientation?
__Heterosexual
__Gay
__Lesbian
__Bisexual
__Pansexual
__Asexual
Other:_____
Employment Status:
__Employed for wages
__Military
__Out of work and looking for work
__Out of work but not currently looking for work
__Self-employed
__Student
__Retired
__Unable to work
Grades:
In your college courses, what grades do you typically receive?
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_Mostly As
_As and Bs
_Mostly Bs
_Bs and Cs
_Mostly Cs
_Cs and Ds
_Ds and Fs
_No Answer
What is your estimated GPA?
_3.5 - 4.0
_3.0 - 3.5
_2.5 - 3.0
_2.0 - 2.5
_1.5 - 2.0
_1.0 - 1.5
_0.5 - 1.0
_0.0 - 0.5
How worried are you that you won’t make the grade you want in your psychology classes?
1- Not at all worried
2- A little worried
3- Somewhat worried
4- Quite worried
5- Extremely worried
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APPENDIX B
Self-Control Scale
Tangney, J., Baumeister, R., & Boone, A. (2004). High Self-Control Predicts Good Adjustment,
Less Pathology, Better Grades, and Interpersonal Success. Journal Of Personality, 72(2),
271-322. doi:10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x
Instructions: Please indicate how much each of the following statements reflects how you typically
are.
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5
Very much

____ 1. I am good at resisting temptation.
____ 2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits. (RC)
____ 3. I am lazy. (RC)
____ 4. I say inappropriate things. (RC)
____ 5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun. (RC)
____ 6. I refuse things that are bad for me.
____ 7. I wish I had more self-discipline. (RC)
____ 8. People would say that I have iron self-discipline.
____ 9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done. (RC)
____ 10. I have trouble concentrating. (RC)
____ 11. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.
____ 12. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong. (RC)
____ 13. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. (RC)
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APPENDIX C
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale. Journal Of Clinical Psychology, 51(6), 768-774. doi:10.1002/1097-4679
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure some of the
ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and indicate how often you do each of the
following. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly.
1 = Rarely/Never, 2 = Occasionally, 3 = Often, 4 = Almost Always/Always
1 I plan tasks carefully.
2 I do things without thinking.
3 I make-up my mind quickly
4 I am happy-go-lucky.
5 I don’t “pay attention.”
6 I have “racing” thoughts.
7 I plan trips well ahead of time.
8 I am self controlled.
9 I concentrate easily.
10 I save regularly.
11 I “squirm” at plays or lectures.
12 I am a careful thinker.
13 I plan for job security.
14 I say things without thinking.
15 I like to think about complex problems.
16 I change jobs.
17 I act “on impulse.”
18 I get easily bored when solving thought problems.
19 I act on the spur of the moment.
20 I am a steady thinker.
21 I change residences.
22 I buy things on impulse.
23 I can only think about one thing at a time.
24 I change hobbies.
25 I spend or charge more than I earn.
26 I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.
27 I am more interested in the present than the future.
28 I am restless at the theater or lectures.
29 I like puzzles.
30 I am future oriented.
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APPENDIX D
Taste Test Form
This portion of the study is designed to assess your preferences and opinions about different types of
food. This information could be used by marketers to better appeal to their audience and advertise
the positive qualities of their products. Please take a moment to taste each type of food presented and
rank each type of food on the dimensions listed below. You may eat as much as you need to
accurately answer the questions below. Ring the bell to notify the experimenter when you have
ranked all of the foods.
1) Skittles™
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the taste?
Please describe the taste as best you can.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the texture?
Please describe the texture.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how appealing does this food look?
Please describe the appearance.
2) M&Ms™
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the taste?
Please describe the taste as best you can.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the texture?
Please describe the texture.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how appealing does this food look?
Please describe the appearance.
3) Broccoli
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the taste?
Please describe the taste as best you can.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the texture?
113

Please describe the texture.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how appealing does this food look?
Please describe the appearance.
4) Cauliflower
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the taste?
Please describe the taste as best you can.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how much do you like the texture?
Please describe the texture.
On a scale of 1 – 10, how appealing does this food look?
Please describe the appearance.
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APPENDIX E
Health Behaviors Questionnaire
Questions are coded on a 7-point Likert Scale:
1 – Never
2 - Rarely/Once a month
3- A few times a month
4 - Once or twice a week
5 – Three to four times per week
6 - Most days
7 - Every day
1) How often do you eat plant protein (lentils, seeds, beans, etc.)?
2) How often do you drink water?
3) How often do you drink soft drinks/soda?
4) How often do you eat fresh fruit?
5) How often do you eat sweets (candy or ice cream)?
6) How often do you eat vegetables or salads?
7) How often do you drink energy drinks?
8) How often do you eat fast food (burgers or fried food)?
9) How often do you eat potato chips or similar snacks?
10) How often do you eat granola or nuts?
Drug use
1) How often do you drink alcohol?
2) How often do you use tobacco products?
3) How often do you use cannabis/marijuana?
4) How often do you use cocaine?
5) How often do you use amphetamine type stimulants (speed, ecstasy)?
6) How often do you use inhalants (nitrous oxide)?
7) How often do you use sedatives or sleeping pills (valium, Rohypnol, etc.)?
8) How often do you use hallucinogens recreationally (LSD, psilocybin, etc.)?
9) How often do you use opioids (heroine, morphine, methadone, codeine etc.)?
Leisure Time Exercise Questionnaire
In a 7-day period (one week), how many times on average do you do the following kinds of exercise
for more than 15 minutes during you free time?
1) Strenuous exercise (heart beats rapidly): running, jogging, hockey, soccer, football,
basketball, martial arts, swimming, strenuous cycling, etc.
2) Moderate exercise (not exhausting): fast-walking, baseball, tennis, easy cycling, volleyball,
badminton, easy swimming, etc.
3) Mild exercise (minimal effort): yoga, archery, fishing, bowling, golf, easy walking, etc.
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In a 7-day period, during your free time, how often do you exercise long enough to work up a sweat
(heart beats rapidly)?
1) Often
2) Sometimes
3) Never
Impulse Buying Questionnaire
1) How often do you engage in impulse buying (i.e. purchasing something that is not on your
shopping list)? □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Often □ Always
2) Generally speaking, I would consider myself to be an impulsive shopper. □ Strongly
Disagree □ Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or □ Strongly Agree
3) I often buy things spontaneously. □ Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or □
Strongly Agree
4) When I shop I tend to decide what I want to buy while I am looking around in a store. □
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or □ Strongly Agree
5) I carefully plan most of my purchases. □ Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or
□ Strongly Agree
6) When I go shopping, I buy things I had not intended to purchase. □ Strongly Disagree □
Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or □ Strongly Agree
7) Even when I see something I really like, I do not buy it unless it is a planned purchase. □
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neither □ Agree or □ Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX F
Monetary-Choice Questionnaire
Kirby, K. N., Petry, N. M., & Bickel, W. K. (1999). Heroin addicts have higher discount rates for
delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls. Journal Of Experimental Psychology:
General, 128(1), 78-87. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.78
For each of the next 27 choices, please indicate which reward you would prefer: the smaller reward
today, or the larger reward in the specified number of days.
1. Would you prefer $54 today, or $55 in 117 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
2. Would you prefer $55 today, or $75 in 61 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
3. Would you prefer $19 today, or $25 in 53 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
4. Would you prefer $31 today, or $85 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
5. Would you prefer $14 today, or $25 in 19 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
6. Would you prefer $47 today, or $50 in 160 days?
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[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
7. Would you prefer $15 today, or $35 in 13 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
8. Would you prefer $25 today, or $60 in 14 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
9. Would you prefer $78 today, or $80 in 162 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
10. Would you prefer $40 today, or $55 in 62 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
11. Would you prefer $11 today, or $30 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
12. Would you prefer $67 today, or $75 in 119 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
13. Would you prefer $34 today, or $35 in 186 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
118

14. Would you prefer $27 today, or $50 in 21 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
15. Would you prefer $69 today, or $85 in 91 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
16. Would you prefer $49 today, or $60 in 89 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
17. Would you prefer $80 today, or $85 in 157 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
18. Would you prefer $24 today, or $35 in 29 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
19. Would you prefer $33 today, or $80 in 14 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
20. Would you prefer $28 today, or $30 in 179 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
21. Would you prefer $34 today, or $50 in 30 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
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[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
22. Would you prefer $25 today, or $30 in 80 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
23. Would you prefer $41 today, or $75 in 20 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
24. Would you prefer $54 today, or $60 in 111 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
25. Would you prefer $54 today, or $80 in 30 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
26. Would you prefer $22 today, or $25 in 136 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
27. Would you prefer $20 today, or $55 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
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APPENDIX G
Anagram Stimuli
On this page are 10 multiple solution anagrams. Multiple solution anagrams are anagrams with
more than one solution. For example, TESATR can be reorganized as TASTER, TATERS, and
TREATS. This is an anagram with three possible solutions. On this page, each anagram has at
least three solutions. Please come up with as many solutions as you can. If you run out of ideas
and want to move on to the next portion of the study, ring the bell to notify the experimenter.
1) AGNTLEIR (triangle)
2) TEHRA (earth)
3) LMAAIN (animal)
4) NRMAOO (maroon)
5) RSPDEES (depress)
6) MTISE (times)
7) ALIRNE (linear)
8) UASTDNHO (thousand)
9) YPMOAINL (Olympian)
10) WOELT (towel)
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APPENDIX H
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test
1) How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? (0) Never (1) Monthly or less (2) 2 to 4 times
a month (3) 2 to 3 times a week (4) 4 or more times a week.
2) How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are drinking? (0) 1
or 2 (1) 3 or 4 (2) 5 or 6 (3) 7, 8, or 9 (4) 10 or more.
3) How often do you have six or more drinks on one occasion? (0) Never (1) Less than monthly (2)
Monthly (3) Weekly (4) Daily or almost daily.
4) How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop drinking once you
had started? (0) Never (1) Less than monthly (2) Monthly (3) Weekly (4) Daily or almost daily
5)

How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected from you
because of drinking? (0) Never (1) Less than monthly (2) Monthly (3) Weekly (4) Daily or almost
daily.

6) How often during the last year have you needed a first drink in the morning to get yourself going
after a heavy drinking session? (0) Never (1) Less than monthly (2) Monthly (3) Weekly (4)
Daily or almost daily.
7) How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking? (0)
Never (1) Less than monthly (2) Monthly (3) Weekly (4) Daily or almost daily.
8) How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened the night
before because you had been drinking? (0) Never (1) Less than monthly (2) Monthly (3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily.
9) Have you or someone else been injured as a result of your drinking? (0) No (2) Yes, but not in the
last year (4) Yes, during the last year.
10) Has a relative or friend or a doctor or another health worker been concerned about your drinking
or suggested you cut down? (0) No (2) Yes, but not in the last year (4) Yes, during the last year.
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APPENDIX I
Weight Concerns Scale
1) How much more or less do you feel you worry about your weight and body shape than other
students your age?
12345-

I worry a lot less than other students.
I worry a little less than other students.
I worry about the same as other students.
I worry a little more than other students.
I worry a lot more than other students.

2) How afraid are you of gaining 3 pounds?
12345-

Not afraid
Slightly afraid
Moderately afraid
Very afraid
Terrified

3) When was the last time you went on a diet?
1234567-

I’ve never been on a diet.
I was on a diet about one year ago.
I was on a diet about 6 months ago.
I was on a diet about 3 months ago.
I was on a diet about 1 month ago.
I was on a diet less than 1 month ago.
I’m now on a diet.

4) Compared to other things in your life, how important is your weight to you?
1- My weight is not important compared to other things in my life.
2- My weight is a little more important than some other things.
3- My weight is more important than most, but not all, things in my life.
4- My weight is the most important thing in my life.
5. Do you ever feel fat?
1- Never
2- Rarely
3- Sometimes
4- Often
5- Always
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APPENDIX J
Achievement Motives Scale
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree
1) I like situations in which I can find out how capable I am.
2) When I am confronted with a problem, which I can possibly solve, I am enticed to start
working on it immediately.
3) I enjoy situations in which I can make use of my abilities.
4) I am appealed by situations allowing me to test my abilities.
5) I am attracted by tasks in which I can test my abilities.
6) I am afraid of failing in somewhat difficult situations, when a lot depends on me.
7) I feel uneasy to do something if I am not sure of succeeding.
8) Even if nobody would notice my failure, I’m afraid of tasks which I’m not able to solve.
9) Even if nobody is watching, I feel quite anxious in new situations.
10) If I do not understand a problem immediately I start feeling anxious.
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APPENDIX K
Financial Stress Questionnaire
1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral/mixed, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree
1) My family has enough money to afford the kind of home we would like to have.
2) We have enough money to afford the kind of clothing we should have.
3) We have enough money to afford the kind of furniture or household equipment we
should have.
4) We have enough money to afford the kind of car we need.
5) We have enough money to afford the kind of food we should have.
6) My family has enough money to afford the kind of leisure and fun activities we want
to participate in.
7) We have enough money to afford the kind of medical care we should have.
8) We are able to pay the bills that we need to pay.
9) We generally have enough money to “make ends meet”.
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